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INTRODUCTION
How should democratic societies regulate their rulemakers? As administra-
tive agencies grapple with novel challenges-from the environment,' to public
health,2 and now, to terrorism 3-- perennial questions reemerge. Chief among
them are the appropriate limits of bureaucratic discretion amidst competing
demands for expertise and public participation. Indeed, modern risks are in-
creasingly complex.4 We need experts for sober insights into the consequences
of our regulatory choices. Only then will administrative decision-making be in-
formed. Yet, these same risks also breed greater uncertainties and, thus, harder
political decisions. Even more urgent, then, becomes the need to ensure those
decisions are transparent and accountable. Only then will administrative deci-
sion-making be legitimate.
These twin goals-technocratic and democratic-often seem at logger-
heads, but they need not be. Reconciling them, however, is not always an easy
task.5 Early theories of administrative law assumed that agencies simply served
as "transmission belts" for detailed legislative pronouncements.6 Voters held
regulators accountable through the legislature, which was charged with prom-
1. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Environmental Law After Katrina: Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law by Reforming Environmental Lawmaking, 81 TUL. L. REV. lO19, 1O9
(2007) (calling for a "fundamental reformation" of environmental law after Hur-
ricane Katrina); Yuhong Zhao, Trade and Environment: Challenges After China's
WTO Accession, 32 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 41 (2007) (exploring environmental ef-
fects of China's economic growth).
2. See, e.g., Kim Elliott, Public Health Preparedness in the 21st Century, 58 ADMIN. L.
REV. 595 (2006) (describing pandemic threats and risks to American public health
system); Michael A. Stoto, Public Health Surveillance in the Twenty-First Century:
Achieving Population Health Goals While Protecting Individuals' Privacy and Confi-
dentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 703 (2008) (discussing privacy implications of new ap-
proaches to public health data collection).
3. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663
(2005) (proposing administrative law principles for reviewing presidential au-
thorizations of military force); Lee Wolosky & Stephen Heifetz, Regulating Terror-
ism, 34 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (2002) (criticizing anti-money laundering regula-
tions).
4. See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 19-24 (1992).
5. See, e.g., GARY C. BRYNER, BUREAUCRATIC DISCRETION: LAW AND POLICY IN FED-
ERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 9 (1987) ("The theory and practice of administrative
government must satisfy the competing expectation of discretion, on the one
hand, and political accountability and the rule of law on the other."). See generally
Richard B. Stewart, Administrative Law in the Twenty-First Century, 78 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 437 (2003) (discussing various theories of democratic legitimacy in the ad-
ministrative state).
6. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1675, 1684 (1975).
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ulgating precise statutory instructions. The New Deal Era, however, saw broad
delegations of authority and growth in the regulatory state; legitimacy thus ad-
hered in the superior expertise of agency officials who could be entrusted to act
in the public interest.7 Still, decades later, growing skepticism about expertise
and the specter of industry capture grounded administrative legitimacy in its
ability to replicate the pluralistic electoral process.' In this view, the function of
congressional and judicial oversight was to ensure sufficient interest group ac-
cess to rulemaking institutions. 9
Given the narrow scope and short time horizons of interest groups, how-
ever, reformers gradually began to search for tools that would ameliorate poor
priority-setting and provide a more global view of a regulation's costs and bene-
fits.' ° Many of those reformers seized upon the analytical tool of cost-benefit
analysis (CBA) as their rallying cry. President George W. Bush's Executive Or-
der 13,422, for example, represents the most recent advance." Most notably, the
order calls for federal agencies to produce measures of total annual costs and
benefits for every proposed regulation, to install political appointees as regula-
tory policy officers, and to identify in writing specific "market failures" to jus-
tify government intervention before promulgating a rule.
Broadly defined, CBA entails the systematic identification of all future
monetized costs and benefits associated with a proposed regulation or policy
decision.1 2 At root, CBA attempts to mimic a basic function of markets by rely-
7. Id. at 1678-8o (characterizing expertise as "the knowledge that comes from special-
ized experience"); see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life of Public Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2029, 2036 (2005).
8. Vandenbergh, supra note 7, at 2036.
9. Id. at 2035. Underlying this shift was the notion that the "public interest" was
nothing more than the aggregate preferences of individuals. Analogously, legisla-
tion was simply the culmination of compromises struck between competing
groups. By mimicking the legislative process, then, legitimacy adhered in agency
decisions that adequately considered affected interests. See Stewart, supra note 6,
at 1712.
1O. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK
REGULATION 19-21 (1993) (arguing that regulatory agendas were set unsystemati-
cally and overly beholden to public perceptions of risk); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE
COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY PROTECTION 6 (2002) (argu-
ing that the "most attractive parts of the movement for cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) have been rooted.., in a more mundane search for pragmatic instruments
designed to reduce the three central problems: poor priority setting, excessively
costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate side effects of regulation").
11. Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 23, 2007), available at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/oljan2oo7l8oo/edocket.access.gpo.gov/2o
o7/pdf/07-293.pdf.
12. While it is true that the term, "cost-benefit analysis" has a host of meanings and
uses, see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification,
and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153 (2000), my defini-
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ing upon an economic criterion-net-benefit maximization-as a metric of
evaluation.'3 Markets are used as a touchstone on the theory that an important
rationale for government intervention is market failure. Therefore, when as-
pects of well-functioning markets-such as perfect information, competition,
robust price signals-are absent, the government has a role to play in inducing
such conditions. Regulations must thus be able to show how they will achieve
an important public objective that the marketplace, on its own, could not pro-
vide.
Even as the movement for CBA grew,' 4 however, bureaucrats were also in-
creasingly seen as "out of touch" with society, leading to concurrent calls for
greater citizen participation and deliberation in the rulemaking process.'5 Al-
lowing lay citizens to participate directly in the formation of administrative
rules, proponents argued, had the potential to increase trust in the rulemaking
process and to educate administrators and citizens alike.'6 Their arguments
arose from a particular view of democracy, one in which legitimate government
authority stems from the collective discussion and reflection of citizens. 7 At its
tion refers to a "method of pure evaluation" and input into administrative deci-
sion-making, id. at 1154; see also infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13. See Robert B. Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation, 94 YALE L.J.
1617, 1621 (1985). Some argue that CBA is not a decision-rule based on net-benefit
maximization, but merely a heuristic for generating information about the possi-
ble scale and scope of some proposal's consequences, along with underlying as-
sumptions. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note lo, at lo ("[Cost-benefit analysis] can
be seen ... not as an endorsement of the economic approach to valuation, but as
a real-world instrument, designed to ensure that the consequences of regulation
are placed before relevant officials and the public as a whole."). Importantly, this
understanding does not require any kind of net-benefit calculation or cost-benefit
ratio, but rather simply aims to be a system for presenting information.
14. See infra Part I.B.
15. See Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Delib-
erative Agency Decision-making, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 174-75 (1997) ("Over the
last thirty years or so, courts, Congress, and scholars have elevated participation
to a sacrosanct status .... Greater participation is generally viewed as contribut-
ing to the democracy, and also to the quality, of decisions by otherwise out-of-
touch bureaucrats." (citations omitted)).
16. See Richard H. Pildes & Cass Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1, 89-95 (1995) (describing initial agency efforts to engage in deliberative
procedures).
17. See JOHN S. DRYZEK, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY AND BEYOND: LIBERALS, CRIT-
ICS, CONTESTATIONS 1-2 (2000) (surveying accounts of deliberative democracy
and concluding that the "only condition for authentic deliberation is... the re-
quirement that communication induce reflection upon preferences in non-
coercive fashion"). It is important to distinguish this conception of deliberation
from competing notions found in the literature, namely, civic republican theories
which promote insulated, expert bureaucrats deliberating over decisions in a
604
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core, it takes reason-as opposed to bargaining or compromise-as its guiding
political procedure. s Deliberation, then, could be understood as "debate and
discussion aimed at producing reasonable, well-informed opinions in which
participants are willing to revise preferences in light of discussion, new informa-
tion, and claims made by fellow participants." 9 Informed and reasoned reflec-
tion,"0 mutual respect between parties when problem-solving,2' and public de-
bate are the new hallmarks of agency legitimacy.22
"public-regarding" way. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1515 (1992) (arguing that civic re-
publicanism provides strong justification for broad delegations to agencies, which
are best situated to deliberate in the public's interest). In this view, bureaucrats are
obligated to defend their choices by appealing to some conception of civic virtue;
as a result, insulating decision-makers from private pressure is crucial to enabling
that process to function appropriately. See Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republi-
can Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541-42 (1988). In contrast, the conception of delib-
eration defended here posits that legitimate administrative decision-making must
carve out a role for lay citizens external to agencies, not only as a locus of ac-
countability but also as a source for information and public values. As such, bu-
reaucrats insulated from the public threaten rather than encourage democratic
desiderata such as transparency and the potential for citizen education.
18. See Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in DELIBERATIVE DE-
MOCRACY: ESSAYS ON REASON AND POLITICS 67, 72 (James Bohman & William
Rehg eds., 1997) ("The notion of a deliberative democracy is rooted in the intui-
tive ideal of a democratic association in which the justification of the terms and
conditions of association proceeds through public argument and reasoning among
equal citizens." (emphasis added)); John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason, in DE-
LIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY, supra, at 93, 95 (arguing that "public reason" should
govern political discourse).
19. See Simone Chambers, Deliberative Democratic Theory, 6 ANN. REV. POL. Scl. 307,
309 (2003). Some criticize these deliberative aspirations as overly "utopian." See,
e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 164 (2003) (de-
scribing deliberative concepts of democracy as "utopian" and "utterly unworkable
under modern conditions"). It is important, however, to distinguish between the
first principles of deliberative democracy and its more pragmatic aspirations. That
is, one can disagree with the epistemic or foundational assumptions of delibera-
tive democrats, yet still think deliberation yields empirically testable hypotheses
related to fostering informed agreement, mutual respect, and greater levels of citi-
zen education.
20. See Rawls, supra note 18, at 95.
21. For examples of collaborative problem-solving in negotiated rulemaking, see Jody
Freeman, Collaborative Governance in the Administrative State, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1,
33-55 (1997). See also AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND
DISAGREEMENT 9 (1996) ("[A] deliberative perspective can help resolve some
moral disagreements in democratic politics, but.., its greater contribution can be
to help citizens treat one another with mutual respect .. "). See generally DELIB-
ERATIVE POLICY ANALYSIS: UNDERSTANDING GOVERNANCE IN THE NETWORK So-
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And so things stand, with powerful advocates for the virtues of deliberation
and CBA marking out their respective territories. Indeed, much of the literature
currently pits CBA and deliberation against one another as mutually exclusive
substitutes: where CBA injects much needed rationality to the cognitive confu-
sion of the masses, deliberation empowers citizens to hold their representatives
accountable. Some like Henry Richardson, for example, bemoan the "stupidity
of the cost-benefit standard" and offer instead a "superior mode" of decision-
making involving deliberative procedures.23 Writers like Cass Sunstein push
back, proclaiming that the "effect of cost-benefit analysis is to subject a public
demand for regulation to a kind of technocratic scrutiny, to ensure that the de-
mand is not rooted in myth, and to ensure as well that government is regulating
risks even when the public demand (because insufficiently informed) is low."1
4
In other words, because public demand is often uninformed and subject to
"cognitive errors," CBA should be lauded for injecting cool-headed reason into
any policy debate.25
This Note rejects both views, and the notion that the two modes of deci-
sion-making are bitter adversaries. Rather, by proposing the idea of deliberative
cost-benefit analysis, it argues that they can-and should-be allies whose short-
comings can be mitigated by the other's strengths. The debate must thus be re-
framed. Simply stated, deliberative cost-benefit analysis entails the use of delib-
erative forums when measuring the costs and benefits of a proposed regulatory
rule. Deliberative forums constitute gatherings of lay citizens that engage in in-
formed and structured discussion. The forums' goals are not only to educate,
but also to provide opportunities for citizens to reflect on and revise their pref-
erences. The insights gained from such forums would then inform regulatory
rulemaking.
As it stands, the contemporary practice of CBA not only fails to achieve its
own objectives, but can also no longer withstand scrutiny as a democratically
legitimate means of regulatory analysis. Given that CBA relies on the aggrega-
tion of individuals' private willingness-to-pay, it undermines many fundamen-
tal tenets of American administrative law. These private judgments of value are
often ill-informed and analyzed using a host of assumptions with little public
scrutiny. Unlike those who criticize CBA without more, however, this Note
proposes an alternative.
CIETY (Maarten A. Hajer & H. Wagenaar eds., 2003) (exploring examples of delib-
erative network-based policy-making).
22. See Cohen, supra note 18, at 72.
23. Henry S. Richardson, The Stupidity of the Cost-Benefit Standard, 29 J. LEGAL STUD.
971 (2000); see also HENRY S. RICHARDSON, DEMOCRATIC AUTONOMY: PUBLIC
REASONING ABOUT THE ENDS OF POLICY 119-29 (2002).
24. Cass Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1067
(2000).
25. Id. at 1073.
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The discussion proceeds in four parts. Part I argues that contemporary
rulemaking is dominated by two models of bureaucratic restraint with an, as
yet, under-theorized relationship. The first model features what I call the "de-
liberative impulse" embodied in both notice-and-comment rulemaking and the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) more broadly.26 This procedure requires
agencies to give notice and to allow parties potentially affected by an agency
rule to present objections or suggestions.27 In turn, agencies must provide rea-
sons for their actions along with evidence in support of their final decisions,
subject to judicial review.2" Parties engage in a back-and-forth exchange of rea-
son-giving and reflection-a nascent process of deliberation.
Against this backdrop, however, such procedures are actually dwarfed on
the ground by de facto requirements to deploy CBA.2 9 While attempts to for-
mally codify cost-benefit requirements in the APA have failed, a mix of execu-
tive orders, guidance documents, and best-practice manuals nonetheless man-
date the procedure as a matter of practice." In this manner, the second model
of administrative restraint arises from this enlarging "cost-benefit regime"
whereby the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches have all imposed
strong norms in favor of the technique.
Given these two trends, Part II introduces the idea of deliberative cost-
benefit analysis, an extension of the deliberative impulse into the realm of CBA.
Deliberative cost-benefit analysis envisions forums for lay citizens to deliberate
about the genuine monetary value of public goods. Such forums would not only
improve CBA analytically, but also help educate citizens about the regulatory
rules that govern their everyday lives. Many have heard of the Food and Drug
Administration 3' and the Clean Air Act,32 but few have any sense of the enor-
mous role they play in regulating everyday life. Drawing upon efforts to imple-
26. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-o6 (2000). The statutory
description of notice-and-comment rulemaking can be found at 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)
(2000).
27. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 6-7 (1982).
28. Id. at 7.
29. See, e.g., President Bush Amends Federal Regulatory Process, OMB WATCH, Jan.
23, 2007, http://www.ombwatch.org/article/articleview/3688/l/368?TopiclD=l
("Though the Administrative Procedure Act outlines the formal rulemaking proc-
ess, in practice, formal rulemaking procedures are rarely used; E.O. 12866 [man-
dating the use of cost-benefit analysis] has been the basis for the regulatory proc-
ess since [President] Clinton used it to replace two Reagan administration
executive orders.").
30. Id.
31. Pure Food and Drug Act of 19o6, ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (19o6), repealed by Federal
Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 902(a), 52 Stat. 1040, 1059 (1938) (estab-
lishing the Food and Drug Administration).
32. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-61 (2000).
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ment deliberative democracy in other contexts, this Part also addresses logistical
concerns including how to recruit citizens and moderate discussion.
Part III then turns to assess the proposal in more detail by exploring its
normative foundations and various arguments for why deliberative cost-benefit
analysis is a necessary feature of democratic society. In doing so, it draws upon
the political science and economics literature to show how deliberation can
mitigate social choice and other related problems. Finally, Part IV confronts in-
evitable objections to the proposal, including the prudence of involving lay citi-
zens in the seemingly expert nature of rulemaking, as well as the potential costs
of the procedure itself.
I. Two MODELS OF CONSTRAINT
While a number of important devices historically have been adopted to
check bureaucratic discretion-ranging from changes in standard agency oper-
ating procedures to increasing external oversight 33-two models of regulatory
constraint currently dominate: the "deliberative impulse" and cost-benefit anal-
ysis (CBA).
A. The Deliberative Impulse
The first model is reflected in the process of notice-and-comment rulemak-
ing under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 34 Enacted in 1946, the Act
provided agencies with wide latitude to promulgate rules, limited only by fairly
minimal procedural requirements." While trial-type formal rulemaking proce-
dures are triggered when Congress requires a decision on-the-record after an
opportunity for a hearing,36 the bulk of rules are promulgated through informal
notice-and-comment. 37 Notice-and-comment rulemaking, as its name suggests,
is a procedure in which agencies give notice of a proposed rule in the Federal
33. BREYER, supra note 27, at 3.
34. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59, 701-o6 (2000).
35. See George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act
Emerges from New Deal Politics, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (1996).
36. See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121
HARV. L. REV. 543, 586 (2007) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 556-57).
37. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107
COLUM. L. REv. 1749, 1761 (2007) ("[A]gencies began to implement these statutes
primarily through notice-and-comment rulemaking rather than through formal
adjudication."); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1390-93 (2004) (comparing different agency procedures); Amy
J. Wildermuth, Solving the Puzzle of Mead and Christensen: What Would Justice
Stevens Do?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1877, 1885 (2006) (describing formal rulemaking,
relative to "notice-and-comment rulemaking," as "a less often used but available
option under the APA").
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Registrar and provide parties with the opportunity to submit comments." The
agency must base the rulemaking on a consideration of the record and include a
statement of basis and purpose in the final rule adopted. 9 If the agency follows
this procedure, then the result is a "legislative" rule with the full force of law."'
At root, notice-and-comment-and the APA more generally-espouses a
set of powerful background norms designed to vindicate what I call a "delibera-
tive impulse," reasoned deliberation between citizens and administrators po-
liced through judicial review. More concretely, the deliberative impulse can be
understood along three axes that lie at the heart of notice-and comment: infor-
mation, participation, and publicity. These three elements-overlapping, yet
analytically distinct-respectively call for preferences that are informed, the
participation of citizens, and a public process of reasoning oriented to the
common good.4' Along the first axis, the APA specifies both the information an
agency must collect, as well as the information it must provide to the public be-
fore, during, and after rulemaking. The most basic requirement is the notice
provided in the Federal Register when a rule is being developed until it becomes
final and binding.
4
Courts have expanded this information-forcing requirement by duly scru-
tinizing whether rules are promulgated only after full consideration of an ade-
quate record.43 Agencies must collect the necessary data and information to sur-
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000).
39. Id. § 553(c).
40. See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).
41. I refer to this phenomenon as a deliberative "impulse" because despite the extent
to which notice-and-comment helps to foster deliberation, it also falls short of the
ideal in many ways. For example, notice-and-comment often fails to make the
best use of available data since the process begins only after the notice of proposed
rulemaking, instead of beforehand when the information would be more valuable
to the agency. As a result, an agency may frame regulatory problems at the early
stages of a rulemaking in a way that "limits rethinking at later junctures." Free-
man, supra note 21, at 13. Moreover, parties forego opportunities to engage con-
structively with each other, instead staking out extreme positions in anticipation
of litigation. Id. at 12 ("Notice and comment.., undermines the implementation
of rules by failing to encourage dialogue and deliberation among the parties most
affected by them."). At the same time, as this Section suggests, the Administrative
Procedure Act set in motion a series of statutory and judiciary reforms such as ne-
gotiated rulemaking that continue to promote the continuing "impulse" of delib-
erative administrative decision-making.
42. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: How GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 62-63 (2003).
43. See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977) (requiring
notice of studies, an adequate statement of reasons, and agency responses to rea-
sonable objections).
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vive "arbitrary or capricious review." 44 Consequently, the preambles of final
rules have become "veritable legal briefs explaining and justifying agency's
choices in great detail." 45 Though the APA's drafters did not contemplate their
current scope, 46 notices of proposed rulemaking now routinely contain the full
text of the rule as well as lengthy preambles, including the information, data,
and analyses upon which the agency relied. Congress has also since enacted
various "information statutes" that apply generally to all rulemaking agencies,
adding yet another layer of publicly available information.
4
Furthering the deliberative impulse, greater avenues for participation allow
members of the public to directly participate in the formation of rules. Inter-
ested parties submit comments, which are collected in the docket; administra-
tors must then be able to justify the ultimate rule by responding to the major
criticisms and suggestions received. Indeed, in National Labor Relations Board v.
Wyman-Gordon Co., the Supreme Court declared that public participation in
rulemaking is meant to ensure that the regulation is responsive to the general
interests of those regulated. 4s Extending these insights, Congress passed the Ne-
44. Id. at 251.
45. John C. Reitz, E-Government, 54 Am. J. COMP. L. 733, 743 (2oo6).
46. A manual prepared by the Attorney General shortly after the passage of the Act
went so far as to advise agencies against publication of the actual text of the rules
for fear that such text would simply "confuse the public." KERWIN, supra note 42,
at 63 (citing JEFFREY LUBBERs, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY RULEMAKING 183
(1998)).
47. For example, the National Environmental Policy Act requires agencies to consider
the effects of rules on the environment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (2000). In doing so,
it calls for various stages of information collection and analysis: first, an environ-
mental assessment to determine whether the contemplated rule will significantly
impact the environment. This assessment requires the agency to solicit informa-
tion from experts and other external parties. If the first stage finds there will be
significant impacts on the environment, the agency must then prepare an envi-
ronmental impact statement, a report on the likely effects of the rule, alternatives
to the rule, and the steps the agency will take to mitigate damage. Similarly, Con-
gress also passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6o1-12 (2000), which
was designed to protect small businesses by requiring agencies to gather informa-
tion on the effects of rules on such entities. See KERWIN, supra note 42, at 60. As
such, agencies are required to consult individuals and interest groups in an at-
tempt to gather the relevant data. In this manner, the basic premises of the APA
along with subsequent statutes highlighted the importance of consulting the pub-
lic in order to ensure that decisions were made with the appropriate information
and statistics. See Texaco, Inc. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 412 F.2d 740, 744 (3d Cir.
1969) (holding that participation by parties with an interest in the regulatory
rulemaking process ensures that agencies' decisions are based upon relevant in-
formation).
48. 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) ("The rulemaking provisions of that Act, which the Board
would avoid, were designed to assure fairness and mature consideration of rules
of general application." (citations omitted)).
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gotiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, 49 authorizing regulatory negotiation as an ap-
proved means for developing rules. In amending the APA, Congress implicitly
endorsed negotiated-rulemaking, a "process by which representatives of the in-
terests that would be substantially affected by a rule.., negotiate [along with
the agency] in good faith to reach consensus on a proposed rule."50 Agency offi-
cials and stakeholders explore their shared interests and differences of opinion,
collaborate in gathering and analyzing technical information, and evaluate their
options according to their respective priorities."1 In this manner, the APA pro-
vides the means through which parties and citizens external to the agency can
participate in the rulemaking process.
Finally, the APA also mandates public justification, most obviously in a
rule's statement of "basis": an explanation of the data the agency considered
when developing the final regulation." Judicial interpretation has been integral
in enforcing and expanding this requirement." For the agency rule to avoid be-
ing termed "arbitrary [or] capricious," 4 for example, the agency must develop
at least a minimal record, subject to public scrutiny.55 Under the courts' "hard
look doctrine," the reviewing court must take a "hard look" at the agency deci-
sion if it believes that the agency "has not genuinely engaged in reasoned deci-
sion-making." 6 Moreover, if the agency eventually decides to promulgate a rule
that is not the "logical outgrowth" of the proposed rule, the final rule may be
deemed invalid. 7 In this manner, judges now have a detailed record before
them, including the interactions between various parties to the rulemaking
process. As a result, agencies are judicially required to give reasons for their de-
49. 5 U.S.C. §§ 561-70 (2000).
50. Phillip Harter, Assessing the Assessors: The Actual Performance of Negotiated Rule-
making, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 32, 33 (2000).
51. Id. at 33-36.
52. KERWIN, supra note 42, at 63.
53. See United States v. N.S. Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249 (2d Cir. 1977)
(holding that, even under arbitrary and capricious review, decisions must be
based on full consideration of an adequate record).
54. 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A) (2000).
55. See Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971).
56. See Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970); see
also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29 (1983) (refusing to uphold a rule rescission absent a reasoned explana-
tion for the action); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc)
(noting that a reviewing court "must engage" in a "substantial inquiry" into the
facts, one that is "searching and careful"); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375, 394 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cass R. Sunstein, Deregulation and the Hard-
Look Doctrine, 1983 SuP. CT. REv. 177 (arguing for a "hard look" approach to judi-
cial review of deregulatory policies).
57. See Weyerhauser v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1031 (D.C. Cir 1978).
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cisions in ways that are responsive to public inputl 8-- a process of deliberation
and reflection supervised by the courts.
B. The Cost-Benefit Regime
Critics of notice-and-comment, however, have charged that the APA allows
for the disproportionate influence of well-organized stakeholders at the expense
of the public interest.5 9 In this view, "[a] participant must be aware that a rule is
being developed ... [and] possess the resources and technical expertise needed
to respond, and, when necessary, have the ability to mobilize others in the effort
to influence agency decision makers."6 By and large, very few other than pro-
fessional lobbyists or lawyers employed by interest groups send in comments,
read the Federal Register, or pursue litigation challenging administrative rules
in federal court.6 While notice-and-comment rulemaking can involve non-
agency members, in practice it only elicits deliberation among a select number
of interested elites.
This ability-real or perceived-of certain parties to influence rulemaking
disproportionately has led many to advocate for CBA "as a way of diminishing
interest-group pressures on regulation and also as a method for ensuring that
the consequences of regulation are not shrouded in mystery but are instead
made available for public inspection and review. "62 Such sentiments may help
explain the enlarging cost-benefit regime and the increasing endorsement of
CBA from all three branches of government, suggesting a growing institutional
58. See Martin Shapiro, The Giving Reasons Requirement, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 179,
181 (describing the "giving reasons requirement" in administrative law as a man-
date not only to "giv[e] reasons to judges," but also to "giv[e] reasons to the pub-
lic").
59. See, e.g., John 0. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51
DUKE L.J. 901, 959 (2001) (criticizing the "special interest domination of the notice
and comment process"); Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Poli-
cies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 636 (2003)
(describing notice-and-comment as "practically speaking, likely to engage primar-
ily well-organized interest groups-those versed in the intricacies of administra-
tive procedure").
60. KERWIN, supra note 42, at 178.
61. Revealingly, litigants in leading cases reviewing rules are generally entities such as
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the Sierra Club, and the Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association. Adjudications involve individuals, of course, but even
then, sustained challenges to general agency practices under the APA's judicial re-
view provisions are often mounted by large organizations. See Edward Rubin, It's
Time To Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 95,102 (2003).
62. Cass Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 4 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law
& Econ. Working Paper No. 39, 1996), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1oo83.
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convergence. Though the Executive Branch's pursuit of CBA has been long-
standing, 63 a watershed moment came with President Reagan's Executive Order
12,291, which also created the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.
6 4
The order declared (1) "to the extent permitted by law," a commitment to CBA;
as well as (2) a requirement that a regulatory impact analysis, including a CBA,
accompany all "major" rules.6 5 While President George H. W. Bush continued
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) review under Reagan's executive or-
der, the election of Bill Clinton raised a number of questions as to the future of
CBA.66 To the surprise of many, Clinton's Executive Order 12,866 affirmed the
Reagan-Bush orders as bipartisan fixtures of American government.6 7 Crucially,
it accepted the basic commitments to assess costs and benefits, while also offer-
ing several revisions mandating that CBA take into account factors like "equity"
and "distributive impacts."68 As a result, the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) alone has spent tens of millions of dollars on CBA in recent decades.6 9
Other agencies are likewise committed to using and improving the techniques
of CBA.7°
63. SUNSTEIN, supra note lo, at lo.
64. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). In practice, the office's traditional role
is intermittent, with little effort to ensure that the Executive branch engages in
priority-setting; however, there are now mechanisms in place that would allow
OMB to reject initiatives with substantial costs, and little perceived benefits. See
SUNSTEIN, supra note io, at 11; see also SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB:
POLITICS AND PROCESS IN THE PRESIDENT'S BUDGET OFFICE 4 (1998) ("Although
the OMB's influence to affect presidential, agency, and congressional actions has
ebbed and flowed over the years, its presence in the center of policy making has
remained a constant."); Curtis W. Copeland, The Role of the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs in Federal Rulemaking, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1257 (20o6).
65. According to Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982):
"Major rule" means any regulation that is likely to result in:
(1) An annual effect on the economy of sioo million or more;
(2) A major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual in-
dustries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic
regions; or
(3) Significant adverse effects on competition, employment, invest-
ment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-
based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises in do-
mestic or export markets.
66. SUNSTEIN, supra note io, at 11.
67. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
68. Id.
69. See Matthew Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE
L.J. 165, 167 (1999).
70. Id.
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Similar efforts to extend the reach of CBA have also come from Congress.
During the "Republican Revolution"7 ' of the mid-199os, for example, the House
Governmental Affairs Committee scheduled a series of hearings addressing
various issues of regulatory reform, one of which focused exclusively on CBA.72
Consequently, the House passed the Risk Assessment and Cost-Benefit Act of
1995, 7' which covered a broad range of risk-related proposals, including CBA for
all major rules. Similarly, the Senate considered the Comprehensive Regulatory
Reform Act of 1995, 74 which would have required that agencies conduct CBA
before imposing any new regulation. Once an agency demonstrated that the
benefits of a regulation outweighed the costs, it also would have had to show
that it was the least costly means of achieving the desired result. The Senate bill
failed to pass by just one vote.75
Although none of these more sweeping legislative proposals succeeded,
congressional enactment of both the 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-
ments76 and the 1996 Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act7 can
"be read as clear signs of congressional concerns about the absence of economic
considerations" in the environment. 7' The Safe Drinking Water Act Amend-
ments constituted "the first substantive law to include such explicit use of eco-
nomic analysis" and mandated the use of cost benefit-analysis for all major
drinking water rules. 79 Importantly, they required the consideration of impacts
71. See generally JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, OFF CENTER: THE REPUBLICAN
REVOLUTION AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2005).
72. See Alexander Nathan Hecht, Administrative Process in an Information Age: The
Transformation of Agency Action Under the Data Quality Act, 31 J. LEGIS. 233, 247
(2005) (citing Press Release, House Governmental Affairs Comm., Continuation
of Regulatory Reform Hearings (Feb. 13, 1995)).
73. H.R. 1022, lo4th Cong. (1995).
74. S. 343, 104th Cong. (1995).
75. Moreover, that same year, the Senate considered the Regulatory Procedures Re-
form Act, S. 1001, 104th Cong. (1995). This Act would have required that federal
agencies conduct a CBA before publishing a "major rule," defined as one which
was likely to have an annual economic effect of over a hundred million dollars. Id.
§ 621(4)(A) ("The Regulatory Procedures Reform Act defines a 'major rule' as 'a
rule or a group of closely related rules that the agency proposing the rule... rea-
sonably determines is likely to have a gross annual effect on the economy of
$1o0,ooo,ooo or more in reasonably quantifiable direct and indirect costs."').
76. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3) (2000).
77. Pub. L. No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 857 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of Titles 5,
15, 28 of the U.S.C.).
78. Richard D. Morgenstern, The Legal and Institutional Setting for Economic Analysis
at EPA, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 5, 19
(Richard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997).
79. Id. at 20.
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on the broader population, instead of only those who were "maximally ex-
posed. "s The Small Business Regulatory Act, in turn, strengthened provisions
in the Regulatory Flexibility Act,8' requiring agencies to assess the effects of sig-
nificant proposed rulemakings on small businesses.s2 In this manner, Congress
has sought to require more explicit consideration of costs and benefits and re-
viewed rules accordingly.
Finally, the courts have also independently designated CBA an important
element of legitimate rulemaking, though recent decisions have arguably miti-
gated this trend s3 In Michigan v. EPA (2000)4 and National Resources Defense
Council v. EPA (1987),5 for example, the courts interpreted provisions of the
Clean Air Act that made no mention of costs in such a way that nevertheless al-
lowed the EPA to take costs into account. Such decisions could be interpreted as
signaling the courts' willingness to recognize a default cost-benefit principle."6
Similarly, National Resources Defense Council v. EPA (1991) s7 and International
Union, UA W v. OSHA (1991)88 both upheld the agency use of CBA in the face of
ambiguous statutory mandates. In perhaps the most aggressive endorsement, in
Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA (1991),89 the Fifth Circuit struck down an EPA
regulation on the grounds that the cost-benefit justification was inadequately
conducted.9 °
80. Id. at 19.
81. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6o1-12.
82. See LUBBERS, supra note 46, at 151-52.
83. Some have read Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), for example,
to imply the Court's rejection of a cost-benefit default principle. In Whitman, the
Court interpreted the Clean Air Act to hold that, absent a clear statutory directive,
the EPA is not authorized to consider costs in establishing National Ambient Air
Quality Standards (NAAQS). See Amy Sinden, Cass Sunstein's Cost-Benefit Lite:
Economics for Liberals, 29 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 191, 237 (2004). However, others
like Cass Sunstein read the Court's holding as narrowly tied to the statutory lan-
guage, which Sunstein argues is particularly clear in disallowing consideration of
costs by the EPA. Thus, the decision can be narrowly read as such-not as a
wholesale rejection of the cost-benefit logic. See SUNSTEIN, supra note io, at 46-47.
84. 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
85. 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
86. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note io, at 64.
87. 937 F.2d 641 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
88. 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
89. 947 F.2d 1201 (sth Cir. 1991).
9o. Id. at 1229-30. According to the court, the EPA committed a multitude of cost-
benefit sins: discounting costs but not benefits, id. at 1218, using inconsistent
valuations for statistical lives, refusing to quantify certain benefits, and refusing to
repeat the analysis with better data supplied by industry, id. at 1227. The court re-
manded for a more adequate analysis. Id. at 1230.
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In this manner, all three branches of government, from the legislature to
the executive to the judiciary, have increasingly demanded cost-benefit analyses
as a central aspect of informal rulemaking. Importantly, these measures have
been proposed as distinct but necessary extensions to the underlying delibera-
tive impulse of the APA: where notice-and-comment allows only for delibera-
tion among elites, CBA represents diffuse interests by estimating the dollar costs
and benefits imposed upon them. Administrative legitimacy, then, rests on both
deliberative principles as well as a broad consideration of the consequences on
the public at large.
II. THE PROPOSAL
To extend these insights to their logical conclusion, deliberative cost-
benefit analysis capitalizes on the deliberative impulse of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA) and advances it into the current cost-benefit regime. De-
liberative cost-benefit analysis basically entails the use of deliberative forums
when measuring the costs and benefits of a proposed regulatory rule. Delibera-
tive forums constitute gatherings of lay citizens that engage in informed and
structured discussion. The goals of the forums are not only to educate, but also
to provide opportunities for citizens to reflect on and revise their preferences.
In turn, the insights gained from such forums would be used to establish, inter
alia, appropriate discount rates and citizens' willingness-to-pay for regulatory
outcomes. 9' When employed in conjunction with-indeed, as an integral part
of-cost-benefit analysis (CBA), the resulting procedure constitutes a more le-
gitimate means of evaluating an administrative rule.
91. There is debate in the literature on the differences between individuals' willing-
ness to pay and their willingness to accept compensation for particular out-
comes-a distinction that can best be illustrated by example. In calculating the
damages caused by an oil spill, analysts could either measure how much people
are willing to pay to avoid or prevent the oil spill or the minimum compensation
they would demand before being willing to accept the consequences of the oil
spill. Put differently, the decision to clean up the spill could depend either on how
much people are willing to pay to have it done or on the compensation necessary
for them to agree to forego the task. See Jack L. Knetsch, Biased Valuations, Dam-
age Assessments, and Policy Choices: The Choice of Measure Matters, 63 ECOLOGI-
CAL EcON. 684, 684 (2007). As a practical matter, however, "economists expect
that the difference between [these two measures] will be small in most cases." U.S.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 60
(2000), http://yosemite.epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/webpages/Guidelines.html/sfile/
Guidelines.pdf; see also Peter A. Diamond et al., Does Contingent Valuation Meas-
ure Preferences? Experimental Evidence, in CONTINGENT VALUATION: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT 42, 66 (Jerry A. Hausman ed., 1993) ("[Tlhere is no basis consistent
with economic assumptions and empirical income effects for WTP and WTA to
exhibit sizable differences.").
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Facilitating implementation, the drafters of the APA were clear that its mi-
nimal procedural requirements were not a ceiling but a floor. On this point, the
Senate and House Reports agreed:
This subsection states, in its first sentence, the minimum require-
ments of public rule making procedure short of statutory hearing. Un-
der it agencies might in addition confer with industry advisory com-
mittees, consult organizations, hold informal "hearings," and the like.
Considerations of practicality, necessity, and public interest . . . will
naturally govern the agency's determination of the extent to which
public proceedings should go. Matters of great import, or those where
the public submission of facts will be either useful to the agency or a
protection to the public, should naturally be accorded more elaborate
public procedures. 92
As such, the drafters of the APA left ample room for innovative procedures de-
signed to vindicate considerations of necessity and public interest. Deliberative
cost-benefit analysis can take advantage of this statutory flexibility in creating
more robust valuations of the issues at stake in rulemaking and, in doing so,
improve agency decision-making.
A. Deliberative Forums
Just as there are multiple normative foundations for the idea, 93 there are
also numerous ways to instantiate the concept of deliberative cost-benefit
analysis in practice. Drawing upon the already rich efforts to establish delibera-
tive forums in other contexts, I will discuss only a few possibilities here; but it is
important to underscore that the perfect (or what is perceived as such) should
not be the enemy of the good. That is, deliberative cost-benefit analysis can only
be refined through experience and thoughtful experimentation. 94 Ex ante objec-
tions along any one dimension should not result in wholesale dismissal, but
rather renewed debate. Accordingly, among current efforts to increase delibera-
92. S. REP. No. 79-752, pt. IV, sec. 4(b) (1945), reprinted in S. COMM. ON THE JUDICI-
ARY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, 1944-46, at
185, 200-01, 259 (1946).
93. See infra Part III.
94. For an overview of this literature, see generally JAMES CREIGHTON, THE PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK: MAKING BETTER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN IN-
VOLVEMENT 5 (2005) (exploring the "mechanics of public participation"); THE
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK: STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE CIvIc EN-
GAGEMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (John Gastil & Peter Levine eds.,
2005) (describing practical issues in increasing citizen deliberation); ARCHON
FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL INNOVA-
TIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE 45-174 (2003) (discussing
case studies in deliberative democracy); Chambers, supra note 19, at 315-18 (sur-
veying efforts to implement deliberative democracy).
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tion-including consensus conferences 95 and participatory budgeting96 -
citizens juries and deliberative polls have perhaps been the most successful in
generating empirical insights, at least in the United States.
In a citizens jury,97 a randomly selected and demographically representative
panel of citizens, meets for four or five days to examine an issue of public sig-
nificance. Usually consisting of eighteen to twenty-four individuals, the group is
designed to emulate the trial jury and serve as a microcosm of the public.9s Ju-
rors are paid a stipend for their time and then hear from and deliberate with a
variety of expert witnesses. On the final day of moderated hearings, the mem-
bers of the citizens jury present their recommendations to decision-makers and
the public.99
Similarly, deliberative polls start with standard public opinion surveys sent
to a scientific random sample of the population.Y° Each respondent is asked a
series of closed-ended questions after which the participant is invited to spend a
weekend of face-to-face discussions at a central site, all expenses paid.'' During
this weekend, briefing materials are sent to the participants and also made pub-
95. See Johs Grundahl, The Danish Consensus Conference Model, in PUBLIC PARTICI-
PATION IN SCIENCE: THE ROLE OF CONSENSUS CONFERENCES IN EUROPE 31
(Simon Joss & John Durant eds., 1995); Carolyn M. Hendricks, Consensus Confer-
ences and Planning Cells: Lay Citizen Deliberations, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOC-
RACY HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at 80.
96. See, e.g., FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 94, at n-12; Boaventura de Sousa Santos,
Participatory Budgeting in Porto Allegre: Toward a Redistributive Democracy, 26
POL. & Soc. 461 (1998).
97. See Ned Crosby & Doug Nethercut, Citizens Juries: Creating a Trustworthy Voice of
the People, in THE DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY HANDBOOK, supra note 94, at ill,
111-19; Graham Smith & Corinne Wales, Citizens' Juries and Deliberative Democ-
racy, 48 POL. STUD. 51 (2001); Jefferson Center, Citizens Jury Process,
http://www.jefferson-center.org/ (follow "Citizens Jury Process" hyperlink) (last
visited Feb. 12, 2008).
98. See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) ("[I]t is part of the estab-
lished tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be
a body truly representative of the community." (citing Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128,
130 (1940))); Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings,
Should Judges Care?, 60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 210 (2007) ("[T]he jury is supposed to
be representative of the public; and if it is indeed representative, it should be
taken as a more knowledgeable microcosm.").
99. See generally Smith & Wales, supra note 97.
loo. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 69-71 (2004);
Christian List, Robert Luskin, James S. Fishkin & lain Mclean, Deliberation, Sin-
gle-Peakedness, and the Possibility of Meaningful Democracy: Evidence from De-
liberative Polls (Jan. 4, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law
& Policy Review), available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2oo6/
meaningful-democracy.pdf.
iol. See ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note ioo, at 47.
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lic. The participants then engage in dialogue with competing experts based on
questions they develop in small group discussions with trained moderators. Af-
ter deliberations, the sample is again asked the original questions. Any resulting
statistically significant changes in opinion can presumably be explained by the
deliberation. In theory, at least, the result would represent the conclusions the
public would have reached had it the opportunity to become more informed
and engaged by the issues. '°2
Building upon these models, administrative agencies implementing delib-
erative cost-benefit analysis would structure analogous sessions in order to
measure the legitimate costs and benefits of proposed regulation. These valua-
tions would be determined by citizens once they were fully informed and had
the chance to reflect upon their preferences. But first things first: How would
these lay citizens be recruited? Jury-list sampling and list-assisted random-digit-
dialing are two of the most promising possibilities, especially as both rely on al-
ready existing infrastructures. First, as its name suggests, jury-list sampling
would follow the lead of the Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968,"03 which en-
courages the use of voter registration lists as the foundation for "source lists."'
10 4
Some have also advocated supplementing this list with names from a national
database of driver registration lists in an attempt to garner a wider popula-
tion.105
Since deliberative forums should be representative of the larger population,
organizers would call members of this list and administer questionnaires re-
questing information about various demographic characteristics, including
gender, race, educational background, and age. These questionnaires could also
be mailed, though evidence suggests that relative response rates would depend
on the subject matter at hand.0 Based on the collected data, administrators
would then select a sample that reflected the demographic characteristics of the
target population at large. When selecting jurors, organizers should strive for
diversity not only across demographic variables, but within them as well. For
102. See James S. Fishkin, Deliberative Polling: Toward a Better-Informed Democracy
(2004) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review),
available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/docs/2oo3/executivesummary.pdf.
103. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69, 1871 (2000).
104. This method is also suggested in David Fontana, Reforming the Administrative
Procedure Act: Democracy Index Rulemaking, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 92 (2005).
For a discussion of how my proposal differs from that of Fontana's, see infra Part
II.B.
1o5. Fontana, supra note 104, at 92.
io6. See FLOYD J. FOWLER, SURVEY RESEARCH METHODS 44 (2002) ("It seems reason-
able, and is consistent with existing evidence, that respondent interest in the sub-
ject may play a bigger role in response to mail surveys than when an interviewer
enlists cooperation.").
619
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
example, educational levels should vary for men and women, while each racial
group should also feature a mix of gender as well as age. '07
In light of well-documented factors tending to skew the demographics of
jury pools ' and driver registration lists,'0 9 however, an alternative approach
would seek to increase representativeness through list-assisted random-digit-
dialing. This technique uses information about which one-hundred blocks
would be most likely to contain residential numbers, since residential (as op-
posed to business or non-functioning) numbers are more likely to be clustered
within groups."' From this list, one can then generate a subset of telephone
numbers to call by randomly selecting a working one-hundred block and then
adding a value from zero to ninety-nine. This process is repeated as many times
as necessary to produce the desired sample size, with an allowance for non-
107. See JEFFERSON CTR., CITIZENS JURY HANDBOOK 32 (2004), http://www.jefferson-
center.org (follow "Citizens Jury Handbook" hyperlink).
lO8. See, e.g., Darryl K. Brown, The Means and Ends of Representative Juries, 1 VA. J.
Soc. POL'Y & L. 445, 446 (1994) ("[R]acial and ethnic minorities, as well as the
young, old, and poor, are consistently underrepresented in most federal and state
court jury pools and wheels"); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Ra-
cial Disenfranchisement in the Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J.
238, 244 (1994) ("Because of differential registration rates by economic and racial
groups... the use of [voter registration] lists alone does not lead to a representa-
tive cross-section of the community.").
lo9. Brown, supra note 1o8, at 454 ("Yet driver lists, while they document low-income
citizens and racial minorities in numbers closer to their actual proportions in the
population, still somewhat under-represent those groups... [as well as] the eld-
erly and women, both of whom drive less than their younger, male counterparts."
(citations omitted)).
110. OFFICE OF POLICY DEv. & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., RAN-
DOM-DIGIT DIALING SURVEYS 6 (2000), http://www.huduser.org/Publications/
pdf/rddlarge98.pdf (describing concepts and procedures used to conduct a ran-
dom digit dialing). Lists of working ioo-blocks used by survey firms are sold by a
handful of firms that specialize in providing such information. These lists of
working loo-blocks are often culled from the Master Exchange Data Base, which
consists of a computerized listing of individual telephone numbers, along with the
relevant state, county, and zip codes. This information, in turn, is used to deter-
mine whether there are at least five working telephone numbers in each exchange
and two in each loo-block, and the resulting list can then used as the basis for de-
veloping a survey sample. Id. In this manner, the technique differs from tradi-
tional random-digit dialing, in which selection of telephone numbers is purely
random. Id. The Jefferson Center has estimated that the purchase of random tele-
phone numbers should be budgeted for about s,5oo. See JEFFERSON CTR., supra
note 107, at 19-20.
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responses."' The larger the sample, and the response rate, the greater the confi-
dence one can have that the random sample is a microcosm of the public."2
Those selected through either procedure would then be recruited heavily to
attend the deliberative gathering and would be offered a stipend for their work.
If initial tests of deliberative cost-benefit analysis yielded low response rates, re-
formers could also consider legislation that would make service on such delib-
erative panels mandatory, modeled again after jury service. 13 More research, of
course, would need to be conducted into this possibility."
4
Once individuals are selected and agree to participate, they would then be
sent a briefing book regarding the rule under consideration as well as its under-
lying rationale. To facilitate a balanced view, opponents of the rule would be
invited to submit rebuttal evidence and contrasting considerations. Citizens
would be encouraged to cross-examine expert witnesses and to avoid taking ex-
pert testimony at face value. During the resulting deliberations, discussion
would be led in small-groups by moderators who would be trained to facilitate
the debate. Each participant would be encouraged to share his or views on the
public goods in question, including personal testimony or objections to the
empirical evidence. After a sufficient amount of deliberation, perhaps signaled
by an anonymous motion and majority vote to close debate, participants would
then be given surveys asking them how much they would be willing to pay for
the various goods subject to regulation. Just as in deliberative polls, the result-
ing aggregate values should represent preferences that are better informed and
take into account the public nature of the goods in question.
Due to cost considerations, these forums need not be used for all rules, but
they would be especially necessary for those rules that attempt to value goods
for which no ready market exists. Such forums might not, for example, be used
for rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission in which the
costs and benefits are largely measured in terms of the impacts on robust pri-
vate securities markets."5 In addition, citizen deliberation is particularly impor-
tant when valuing goods that are politically salient or that resonate with social
meaning, lest the decision be-or be perceived to be-left to unelected techno-
Ill. Id. at 6-7.
112. See Robert C. Luskin, James S. Fishkin, Dennis L. Plane, Deliberative Polling and
Policy Outcomes: Electric Utility Issues in Texas 5 (Nov. 1999) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://cdd.stanford.edu/research/papers/2ooo/utility_
paper.pdf.
113. See, e.g., Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-69, 1871 (2000).
114. David Fontana's deliberative notice-and-comment model suggests the use of
summons procedures to require participation. Fontana, supra note 104, at 93. In
contrast, however, Fishkin's deliberative polls rely solely on voluntary participa-
tion. Fishkin, supra note 102, at 2.
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Securities and Exchange Commission, SEC Begins Small
Business Costs and Benefits Study of Sarbanes-Oxley Act Section 404 (Feb. 1,
20o8), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2oo8/2oo8-8.htm.
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crats. 1 6 Thus, for example, one would expect to see such rules deployed when
calculating the monetary value of human life' l7 and the potential impacts of
climate change on the environment."s To prevent manipulation of the decision
of when to use or not to use deliberative cost-benefit analysis, specific agencies
that are regularly forced to make decisions about public goods-like the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS)-would use deliberative cost-benefit analysis as a default in
place of traditional methods, particularly for "major" rules expected to have
impacts of over $100 million." 9
Another way to instantiate deliberative cost-benefit analysis is by providing
opportunities for citizens to determine contested aspects of cost-benefit analy-
ses such as the appropriate population, variables, or discount rates to employ in
a study-issues which will be discussed in more depth later.' Discounting is
the calculation of the present value of a future cost or benefit, based on the
premise that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar tomorrow: while waiting
for a future dollar to arrive, a current dollar could be earning interest in the
bank or elsewhere.'21 Parents, who might be expected to value future genera-
tions more heavily, may present vivid reasons drawn from personal experience
for using a higher discount rate and convince others accordingly. At the same
16. Some like Cass Sunstein would argue that such politically sensitive situations are
precisely when deliberation should not be used since the danger of emotion and
irrationality is at a zenith. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at lO65-73. However, such
worries can be mitigated by preserving the role of experts, see infra Part IV.B, and
helping to ensure that individuals involved in the deliberations are informed of
the actual magnitude of risks and the ways in which such risks can be exaggerated.
117. See Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999) (discussing issues in
valuation of human life); Katharine Q. Seelye & John Tierney, E.P.A. Drops Age-
Based Cost Studies, N.Y. TIMES, May 8, 2003, at A34 (reporting public controversy
over age-based valuations of human life and so-called "senior death discount").
118. See, e.g., Danny Hakim, Battle Lines Set as New York Acts to Cut Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 26, 2005, at Ai (describing a clash between politicians, environmen-
talists, and manufacturers over a regulation to cut automotive emissions of green-
house gases); Stephen Power, EPA Chief Makes Political Target, WALL. ST. J., Feb.
19, 2008, at A7 (describing the EPA Administrator as a "political target" for Bush
administration climate change policies).
119. This requirement would align with past Executive Orders that, in effect, require
CBAs for "significant regulatory action" or "major" rules projected to have an an-
nual economic effect of s1oo million or more. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R.
127 (1981) (President Reagan) and Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993)
(President Clinton); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing
definition of "major" rules).
120. See infra Part IJI.D.
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time, experts might present diverging arguments for lowering or raising the rate
based on economic growth' " or risk and uncertainty."3 Given that such deci-
sions are inevitably discretionary at the margins, they must not only be open to
informed debate, but also placed in the hands of those most affected by them.'
4
Thus, a deliberative panel could be charged with reaching consensus on the ap-
propriate discount rate to use."'
Experts would still play a central role."26 Citizens would not be given carte
blanche in making decisions-about the discount rate or otherwise-but rather,
here, would be charged with choosing a rate within the existing range of expert
disagreement.' 7 Regulatory agencies, for example, generally use discount rates
of either three or seven percent, and the Office of Management and Budget's
most recent guidance recommends that agencies should report costs and bene-
fits using both rates. ' Given these expert disparities, citizen input would there-
fore be valuable in choosing between these two rates and evaluating the com-
peting explanations proffered for both. In this manner, there is ample room for
122. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heal, Discounting: A Review of the Basic Economics, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 59, 71-77 (2007) (discussing various factors that inform the choice of dis-
count rate, including economic growth); Ari Rabl, Discounting of Long-Term
Costs: What Would Future Generations Prefer Us To Do?, 17 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 137,
139 (1996) (explaining that conventional discount rate analysis considers the crea-
tion of wealth rather than only intergenerational redistribution); Dexter Samida &
David A. Weisbach, Paretian Intergenerational Discounting, 74 U. CHi. L. REV. 145,
169 (2007) ("[L]ong-run discount rates should instead be limited to expected
long-run economic growth because this is the true opportunity cost.").
123. See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Discounting for Regulatory Analysis, 74 U. CHI. L.
REV. 209, 221 (2007) (arguing for a "riskless rate of return"); cf. Louis Kaplow,
Discounting Dollars, Discounting Lives: Intergenerational Distributive Justice and Ef-
ficiency, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 79, 1O6-07 (2007) (demonstrating different considera-
tions in factoring in uncertainty and risk assessments for intergenerational com-
parisons).
124. See infra Part III.D.
125. See MICHAEL SAWARD, DEMOCRATIC INNOVATION: DELIBERATION, REPRESENTA-
TION AND ASSOCIATION 36-38 (2000) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of
consensus-based versus majoritarian decision rules).
126. See infra Part IV.
127. See Edward R. Morrison, Comment, Judicial Review of Discount Rates Used in
Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1333, 1336 (1998) ("Agencies
exhibit striking inconsistencies in their use of discount rates.").
128. See Viscusi, supra note 123, at 224 (after surveying all regulations reported to Con-
gress by OMB in 2005, reporting that "the OMB guidance of 3 percent and 7 per-
cent discount rates seems to have taken hold"); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
CIRCULAR A-4, REGULATORY ANALYSIS 34 (2O03), available at http://www.white
house.gov/omb/circulars/aoo4/a-4.pdf ("For regulatory analysis, you should pro-
vide estimates of net benefits using both 3 percent and 7 percent.").
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bureaucratic discretion that reflects value choices that should, in turn, be con-
strained by the thoughtful and informed discussion of citizens.
B. Role in the Rulemaking Process
Institutionalizing deliberative cost-benefit analysis as a more formal part of
the administrative process would not require radical changes in either judicial
review or implementing legislation. Certainly, legislation could mandate or
simply create incentives for agency adoption-and such efforts should be vig-
orously advocated. Part I, however, has already described various reform
movements underway that would likely support the proposal. Moreover, in-
creased interest group pressure from parties seeking to legitimize the rulemak-
ing process has resulted in norms favoring increased citizen participation.
Agencies, for example, already voluntarily engage in limited forms of stake-
holder consultations, focus group meetings, and town hall style meetings for
open discussion.2 9
To illustrate, the EPA recently worked with the Jefferson Center, the "origi-
nator" of the citizens jury process,13° to conduct a citizens jury on global climate
change.'31 Eighteen citizens from a thirty-five-mile radius of Baltimore, Mary-
land, were chosen from a randomly identified jury pool to serve as a representa-
tive microcosm of the public. Over five days, the jury heard expert witness pres-
entations on a range of issues related to global climate change.'32 The citizens
jury focused on which potential impacts of climate change were of most con-
cern, and what, if anything, should be done to address the problems. Jurors de-
liberated and developed recommendations for policy makers to consider, while
also reporting changes in their own perspectives.'3 3 While this example illus-
trates how agencies could either directly organize forums, or contract out the
task to research or non-profit bodies, it also suggests that the institutional mo-
mentum for reform already exists.
To further see how deliberative cost-benefit analysis would fit into current
administrative practices, it is helpful to distinguish it from David Fontana's re-
129. See, e.g., Press Release, Am. Health Care Ass'n, Long Term Care Profession, At
HHS/OMB Town Hall Meeting, Outlines Its Concerns Regarding Economic Im-
pact of Health Care Regulations (Nov. 4, 2005), http://www.ahca.org/news/
nro511o4.htm (describing a town-hall meeting on economic consequences of
health care regulation sponsored by HHS and OMB).
130. See Jefferson Center-Welcome to the Jefferson Center, http://www.jefferson-
center.org (last visited Apr. 7, 20o8) (describing the Jefferson Center as the "Ori-
ginator of the Citizens Jury Process").
131. See JEFFERSON CTR., CITIZENS JURY: GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 1 (2002),
http://www.jefferson-center.org (follow "Past Projects" hyperlink; then follow
"Citizens Jury on Global Climate Change-2002" hyperlink).
132. Id. at I.
133. See id. at 20 (reporting juror comments).
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cent proposal for "deliberative notice-and-comment" (DNC). '" Essentially,
Fontana proposes a two-step process whereby stakeholders and lay citizens
would be summoned to participate in "randomly organized juries" with the
goal of providing an evaluative report to the agency about a proposed rule.'3' In
place of regular notice-and-comment, individuals would be asked to deliberate
about the merits and drawbacks of a rule, the results of which the agency would
have to take seriously before deciding to eventually accept or reject them.'
36
Agencies would have an incentive to employ DNC since the resulting rule
would receive more deference if the rule was challenged in court.
37
Fontana's proposal-though a step in the right direction-wholly ignores,
however, the de facto centrality of CBA in formulating the rule itself. Conse-
quently, he fails to extend the insights of the APA into the actual-and often
dispositive-practices employed by administrative officials who draft the rules,
inviting citizen input only after the rule has been proposed. In this sense, his
proposal and that of deliberative cost-benefit analysis part ways entirely. Simply
asking citizens to evaluate a rule ex post heightens the possibility for underlying
cost-benefit studies to be seen as expert, technical and thus worthy of deference.
Indeed, ample evidence suggests that numbers tend to have an "anchoring" ef-
fect on group judgments, "' while unquantifiable benefits are often ignored in
favor of quantifiable costs, thus biasing against new regulation. 139 Deliberation,
as it were, must occur from the ground up.
At the same time, the two proposals are not mutually exclusive: one could
imagine a deliberative cost-benefit analysis followed by DNC. In this sense,
both procedures highlight different functions for deliberation. Fontana views
deliberation as a means for adopting or rejecting a rule. Deliberative cost-
benefit analysis, by contrast, views it as a necessary feature of the rule's expert
evaluations and perceived consequences. In other words, citizens must play an
important role in measuring the rule's effects on society. Not surprisingly, then,
the two proposals also diverge in their strategies for agency adoption. Fontana
134. Fontana, supra note 104, at 82.
135. Id. at 91-96 (describing DNC).
136. Id. at 95.
137. Id. at 11o.
138. See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More
You Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, lo APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
519, 526 (1996) (reporting that plaintiffs' requested amounts as an anchor that had
a linear effect on compensation awards); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shap-
ing Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal In-
jury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491, 494-95 (1989) (finding an essentially linear
relationship between the amount requested and the amount awarded).
139. See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 15o U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1579 (2002) (arguing that un-
quantifiable benefits and readily quantifiable costs tend to skew decision-making
against increased environmental protection).
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argues for "deliberative deference,"' 4° a "form of judicial review, created to en-
tice agencies to use participatory schemes of rulemaking [that] would make it
quite difficult to obtain pre-enforcement review of a legislative rule," and an
"extremely deferential standard of review once that rule made it into court."14'
Here, agencies presumably would be motivated to use DNC since more delib-
eration would necessarily imply greater deference from the courts.
While deliberative cost-benefit analysis would certainly benefit from such
shifts in existing doctrine and the likely necessary amendments to the APA, ex-
isting features of the policy-making toolkit already make deliberative cost-
benefit analysis potentially attractive to agencies. Unlike DNC which calls for
deliberation over the proposed rule, deliberative cost-benefit analysis would still
be only one factor-albeit an important, presumptive one' 42-in choosing
which rule to propose in the first place. Because agencies would be interpreting
executive orders requiring CBA,' 43 they would likely use "guidance documents"
to promulgate the procedure, thus allowing for experimentation and evalua-
tion, subject only to limited judicial review.'"
Moreover, the same policy motivations underlying the rise of negotiated
rulemaking would also support deliberative cost-benefit analysis. To recall,
members of negotiated rulemaking committees determine what factual infor-
mation and data are necessary to make a reasoned decision, analyze that infor-
mation, and examine the relevant legal and policy issues. 45 Its proponents ar-
gued that the technique would decrease the threat of legal challenge, since rules
developed by the consensus of affected parties would be less likely to generate
subsequent conflict and disagreement.1 46 As a result, the agency would save both
time and resources during the rulemaking process by addressing objections and
incorporating information, thus securing buy-in from interested parties more
140. Fontana, supra note 104, at 89.
141. Id.
142. Just as Cass Sunstein argues for regular CBA, deliberative CBA "should command
such a consensus, at least as a presumption," and the presumption in favor of
CBA should operate regardless of political commitments. SUNSTEIN, supra note
io, at 20.
143. See supra note 65.
144. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV.
1383, 1391 (2004). Even if a court considers the document to be a "final agency ac-
tion," it may not be "ripe" for review. Util. Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 320 F.3d
272, 278-79 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that a challenge to EPA manual provisions
requiring greater monitoring in permits was unripe); see also Nat'l Ass'n of Home
Builders v. Norton, 415 F.3d 8, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (refusing to review a survey
protocol because the document was non-binding).
145. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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effectively ex ante. 47 The same efficiency concerns would make deliberative
cost-benefit analysis appealing as well.
A growing body of evidence, however, suggests that negotiated-rulemaking
has fallen short of these expectations, with such rules taking just as long to
promulgate as before, with little decrease in the likelihood of litigation.
'48
Though more data are necessary before reaching a firmer conclusion, there are
multiple reasons to think that parties would be less likely to challenge a rule af-
ter deliberative cost-benefit analysis relative to negotiated rulemaking. Most
importantly, the former involves lay citizens who are more likely to be disinter-
ested relative to stakeholders in negotiating committees. As a result, interest
groups may be more hesitant to challenge a rule based on the considered judg-
ment of the general public, especially if such rules are perceived as more legiti-
mate and less likely the product of captured agencies or rent-seeking parties.
49
If deliberative forums are well-publicized, particularly contentious proposed
regulations may gain broader public support, which would in turn place pres-
sure on overly-litigious parties not to bring suit.' Finally, administrators may
simply believe that the technique is a more analytically sound tool for measur-
147. Id. (arguing that regulatory negotiation can head off the "wrangling and disputes"
that make "regulations take an enormously long time to become effective").
148. See, e.g., Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It
Takes To Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN
THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 187, 203-04 (George A. Krause & Ken-
neth J. Meier eds., 2003) ("Our research demonstrates.., that rules to which
regulatory negotiation was applied took longer to issue than those developed
through conventional proceedings, despite the fact that agencies were more likely
to conduct regulatory negotiations in situations that were amenable to relatively
rapid resolution. In general, we find no evidence that consensual rule making re-
duces the time it takes to develop rules."); Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus:
The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1335
(1997) ("Negotiated rulemaking does not appear any more capable of limiting
regulatory time or avoiding litigation than do the rulemaking procedures ordinar-
ily used by agencies .... The litigation rate for negotiated rules issued by the EPA
has actually been higher than that for other significant EPA rules."). But see Laura
I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation Versus Conventional
Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 1o J. PUB. ADMIN.
RES. & THEORY 599, 625 (2000) (finding that participants in selected negotiated
rulemakings had higher levels of satisfaction with the process).
149. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Consensus Versus Incentives: A Skeptical Look at Regu-
latory Negotiation, 43 DUKE L.J. 12o6, 1209-10 (1994) (characterizing negotiating
rulemaking as "similar to a contract negotiation in which all parties expect to gain
from an agreement but where the gains can be divided up in different ways").
15o. At the same time, it is also possible that deliberative polls could increase public
awareness and thus motivate even more individuals to challenge the rule; the ul-
timate outcome is an empirical question.
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ing public costs and benefits,'5 ' and thus make a professional judgment to adopt
the practice.
Previous empirical efforts suggest that deliberative cost-benefit analysis
would be successful in the regulatory context. For example, between 1996 and
1998, eight Texas electric utilities used deliberative polls to determine what en-
ergy options citizens preferred to meet future electricity requirements. 15' As
regulated monopolies, all electric utility companies in Texas had to periodically
submit an Integrated Resource Plan for meeting the service territory's electricity
needs. As part of this process, they were required by the Public Utility Commis-
sion to take customer preferences into account." But meaningful and informed
preferences had been hard to uncover, which helped motivate the utility com-
panies' decision to use deliberative polls.
54
The polls combined telephone surveys with town meetings where custom-
ers learned more about energy choices and discussed the issues with each other
and panels of experts. Regulatory staff of the Texas Public Utility Commission
participated as Advisory Group members, small group moderators, while the
Commissioners served as expert panelists.'" After deliberating, they responded
to the initial survey again, this time on the basis of their informed opinions.' 56
Across the eight polls, the percentage of those willing to pay more for alterna-
tive and renewable energy sources rose dramatically.57 One of the companies,
West Texas Utilities, for example, discovered that informed customers were al-
most twice as likely to support energy research even if such research raised
rates. The percentage of deliberative poll participants agreeing to this proposi-
tion soared from seventeen percent to thirty-one percent after they were edu-
cated on the benefits of research expenditures." 8 Citizens became committed to
paying more in order to encourage public goods like research and development.
Another Texas public utility, Central Power and Light, drew upon similar
results from its deliberative poll when deciding to charge each of their custom-
ers an additional twenty-five to fifty cents per month to build a new wind
farm.5 9 After the regulatory plan was challenged, the utility referred to a par-
151. See infra Part III.
152. Luskin, Fishkin & Plane, supra note 112, at 4.
153. Id. at 3.
154. See, e.g., Larry Jones, Educated Opinions, ELECTRIC PERSP., Jan./Feb. 1997, at io-11.
155. See R.L. LEHR ET AL., LISTENING TO CUSTOMERS: How DELIBERATIVE POLLING
HELPED BUILD 1,000 MW OF NEW RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECTS IN TEXAS 9
(2003) (unpublished technical report), http://cdd.stanford.edu/polls/energy/2oo3/
renewable energy.pdf.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id. at 12.
159. Id. at 8.
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ticipants' survey conducted more than a year after the original deliberative poll.
Central Power and Light provided the participants with information on the
wind project, explaining the higher cost and asking whether the amount was
too much or too little. The participants responded that the company's plan was
acceptable and that the company might consider expanding clean energy op-
tions even more."6° More than a year after the initial deliberative poll, partici-
pants' opinions held firm on their willingness-to-pay more for renewable
sources.
What these examples demonstrate in addition to the real potential of delib-
erative forums to change individual preferences are the incentives that agencies
already possess to engage in the practice. In Texas, Central and South West
Corporation had turned to deliberative polls in a genuine attempt to determine
what values its customers placed on various energy options early enough to in-
corporate the feedback into their Public Utility Commission plan. As regulatory
case manager Ron Ford explains: "We considered the more traditional ap-
proaches to customer involvement, such as telephone surveys, focus groups,
town meetings, or advisory groups," but "none of the methods gave the level of
involvement that we were seeking. ' ' 6 ' Because power plants could cost as much
as soo million to build, they felt that "customers' input needed to be more than
a top-of-the-head opinion. '62
As such, agencies already have a host of reasons to pursue deliberative cost-
benefit analysis, and radical changes in judicial doctrine or large-scale statutory
reforms are not necessary to encourage its adoption. According to one senior
vice president at the Texas utility, "[ilt may have been a risk to take this type of
approach in the old world, but those days are gone .... As we move into a new
era, utilities are going to have to find new ways of identifying what their cus-
tomers want, as well as ways of responding to those expectations."'6 3 Delibera-
tive cost-benefit analysis-just like normal cost-benefit analysis-should not
place agencies in an "arithmetic straightjacket," but rather present a strong pre-
sumption that would constitute an important legal and policy advancement for
the rulemaking process as a whole.'
6 4
III. EVALUATING DELIBERATIVE COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Deliberative cost-benefit analysis encourages the reconciliation of princi-
ples underlying deliberative democracy and the cost-benefit regime, and en-
courages agencies to explore ways to manifest this ideal. At bottom, both delib-
eration and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) mitigate the democratic deficit created
16o. Id.
161. Jones, supra note 154, at io.
162. Id. (quoting James Fishkin who helped to organize the polls).
163. Id.
164. SUNSTEIN, supra note lo, at 22.
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by administrative delegation in different, but complementary, ways. On the one
hand, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) creates an avenue for judicially
supervised participation and information-sharing with external parties through
notice-and-comment and negotiated rulemaking. Such parties, however, are
self-selecting and thus non-representative of the citizenry at large. On the other
hand, CBA presents a method for taking into account the interests of all af-
fected citizens. These methods, however, often neglect distributional concerns
and meaningful avenues for participation.
Accordingly, the underlying foundation for deliberative cost-benefit analy-
sis is deceptively simple: democratically legitimate rulemaking must assess costs
and benefits only after opportunities for deliberation with and among non-elite
citizens. To demonstrate this proposal's normative force, this Part considers
four major criticisms of the current cost-benefit regime and explores how delib-
eration mitigates each of them.
A. The Aggregation Problem
The first set of critiques centers on the claim that any aggregation device for
producing collective choices is arbitrary, and therefore fails to reflect anything
meaningful about the preferences or will of the people. This criticism is particu-
larly salient since one of the strongest democratic arguments for CBA rests on
the idea that it measures social preferences, and thus reflects the public's desires
writ large.
To understand this argument, it is helpful to look at how the technique is
applied in practice. Consider a typical CBA conducted by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). 6 Federal law currently requires the agency to regu-
late lead contamination of drinking water.166 In 1991, the EPA decided to revise
its previously issued regulations by conducting a CBA of several proposed rules.
Using a three-percent discount rate, the EPA estimated the cost of treating con-
taminated water that enters a particular distribution system; the cost of main-
taining water quality; the cost of replacing lead pipes; the cost of warning the
public of high lead levels and informing it of precautions; and the cost of moni-
toring water quality.161 For each rule, the EPA then calculated the total cost by
aggregating the projected costs for each of the water distribution systems across
the country.
In contrast, only some of the benefits of the regulations were monetized.
The EPA estimated, for example, that the cost of medical treatment for children
with elevated lead levels would be between about $300 and $3,200 per child, the
165. See generally EcONOMIcs ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT (Ri-
chard D. Morgenstern ed., 1997) (describing the use of economics at the EPA).
This particular example is drawn from Adler & Posner, supra note 70, at 172-73.
166. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3oog-1 (2000).
167. See Ronnie Levin, Lead in Drinking Water, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra
note 165, at 205, 216-22.
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cost of compensatory education for children with "cognitive damage" would be
about $5,8oo, and the cost of lost future earnings would be about $4,600 per lost
point of intelligence quotient.'6 ' For adults, the EPA estimated individuals' will-
ingness-to-pay at si million to avoid nonfatal heart attacks and strokes, $628 per
case of hypertension for medical costs and lost productivity, and $2.5 million
per death .69 Total benefits (in terms of costs avoided) were then calculated by
multiplying these amounts by the estimated number of cases avoided. As a re-
sult, the EPA concluded that total health benefits from corrosion control alone
would exceed the total cost by a factor of more than ten to one.'7 0
This brief glance at a representative CBA illustrates several practical as-
sumptions underlying the technique. First, the EPA, like other government
agencies, uses individuals' "willingness-to-pay" as a measure of regulatory bene-
fits through revealed preference or contingent valuation studies.' 7 At its core,
revealed preference theory rests on the assumption that when an individual is
observed buying a collection of goods, X, when she could have bought another
collection of goods, Y, within her budget, she must have preferred X over Y, and
thus chosen it. 17' As a corollary, the value assigned to the preferred good can be
observed through market transactions that presumably reflect the maximum
amount of money the buyer was willing to relinquish in exchange for obtaining
that good: the buyer's "willingness-to-pay."'7 3 In this manner, cost-benefit ana-
lysts assume that individual market behavior can provide data about individual
preferences, and the best way to discover somebody's preferences is to observe
her market choices with real consequences that she will have to bear.
7 4
168. Id. at 224.
169. Id. at 224-25.
170. Id. at 223.
171. See generally W. Michael Hanemann, Valuing the Environment Through Contin-
gent Valuation, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1994) (describing the use of contingent
valuation methods to value environmental resources); Paul A. Samuelson, Con-
sumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15 EcONOMICA 243, 243 (1948)
(describing revealed preference theory in terms of the "individual guinea-pig,
[who] by his market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern"); U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91, at 60-62 (presenting EPA guidance on using will-
ingness-to-pay measures).
172. See Amartya Sen, Behaviour and the Concept of Preference, 40 ECONOMICA 241, 241
(1973).
173. Similarly, a seller of some good, who receives money in exchange for relinquish-
ing the good, relinquishes it because the amount she can get is large enough for
her to be willing to part with the object. Underlying this logic is the notion that
there is a minimum amount of money needed to make a seller willing to relin-
quish the good: the amount referred to as her willingness to accept. See U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 91, at 60-62.
174. An example may help. The hedonic-property-value method, for instance, is often
used to isolate the value placed on a non-market good like "clean air." This
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Alternatively, some analysts employ what is known as contingent valuation
to measure individuals' willingness-to-pay though their stated preferences. Such
techniques are often used when it is especially difficult to establish shadow
prices through revealed preferences, or when markets are missing due to the
non-rivalry or non-excludability of the good. 75 Generally, this method ascer-
tains individual preferences by directly asking people in a survey how much
they would be willing to pay for successive additional quantities of the non-
market asset. 76 Once the individual values are aggregated, the result should cor-
respond to a market demand curve for the public good. 7 The method is "con-
tingent" because people are asked to state their willingness-to-pay, contingent
on a specific scenario or description of the environmental quality.
17s
As these techniques make clear, CBA attempts to aggregate individual pref-
erences in terms of monetary units. Both revealed and stated preference tech-
niques profess to operate under the "neutral" assumption that a dollar is equally
valuable to everyone, since "[o]ur only objective general indication is [one's]
method assumes that individuals place value on some "bundle" of desirable char-
acteristics provided by a unit of chosen property. By controlling for the effects of
all other characteristics (e.g., crime rate, quality of schools), analysts then attribute
the remaining differences in property value to differences in the value of clean air.
Similarly, the travel-cost approach to valuing recreation uses an individual's cost
of travel to some recreation site as a measure of that individual's willingness to
pay for that recreation site. In turn, the method then uses this information along
with the demanded quantity of recreation (perhaps the number of people who
visited the site) to estimate society's willingness to pay for the recreation activity.
For other examples, see Robert W. Hahn & John A. Hird, The Costs and Benefits of
Regulation: Review and Synthesis, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 233, 237-47 (1991).
175. See Hanemann, supra note 171, at 19-21.
176. In some cases, people are asked for the amount of compensation they would be
willing to accept to give up these assets. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra
note 91, at 6o-61.
177. Id. at 61.
178. For example, consider the case of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil tanker that spilled
eleven million gallons of oil across Alaska's Prince William Sound. Scientists esti-
mated that between 75,000 and 150,ooo birds and more than 6oo otters and seals
were killed. To estimate the monetary value of the damage, a team of economists
used contingent valuation: first, they set up focus groups across the country to
give researchers a sense of what people knew about the Exxon spill and how they
felt. Based on the gathered information, researchers drafted the final question-
naire, which asked how much people would be willing to pay to prevent the dam-
age to the Sound. Eventually, the researchers determined that Americans were
willing to pay $31 per household to have prevented the spill. That amount, multi-
plied by the number of households in America, equaled $2.8 billion-the putative
contingent value of the damage caused by the oil spill. See Natalie Phillips, In Pub-
lic Eye: Spill Toll Higher-State Backed Survey Puts Tab at s2.8 Billion, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Jan. iO, 1993, at Al.
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money income."' 79 In this view, money can serve as a proxy for how much one
would gain from the outcome itself. Though many analysts admit that they are
measuring "a surrogate [for welfare], of course, and an imperfect surrogate at
that," they nonetheless maintain that using money as a measure of welfare is the
best of what are inevitably flawed indicators."°
Given that CBA uses money as a proxy for aggregating individual prefer-
ences, however, it is vulnerable to a host of social choice critiques. Though CBA
differs from ordinal voting procedures-the traditional target of social choice-
the argument here is not that both yield the same problems in the same way.
Rather, their affinities are emblematic of a deeper and analogous class of issues
that vex all preference-based theories. Indeed, Kenneth Arrow famously argued
that it is impossible for any aggregation mechanism of individual preferences to
satisfy five seemingly innocuous and undemanding criteria; as a result, such
mechanisms are arbitrary and subject to undemocratic manipulation."8 ' Arrow's
findings-known as the impossibility theorem-suggested that if any decision-
making body has at least two members and at least three options to decide be-
tween, then it is impossible to design a social choice function which is not vul-
nerable to dictatorship or to the strategic manipulation of rules by shrewd po-
litical actors, thus questioning the relationship between attempts to aggregate
preferences with the democratic project itself."2
In a related vein, William Riker attacked the notion of collective choice as a
manifestation of some popular will by arguing that there is no such popular will
that exists independently of the particular mechanism used to measure it; that
is, identical distributions of preferences will yield different social choices for dif-
ferent decision rules.'8 3 This insight led many to the conclusion that social
choice theory had effectively exposed the basic limits of aggregating preferences
179. ABBA P. LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE Eco-
NOMICS 24 (1944).
18o. EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 278
(1978).
181. The first condition is unanimity, whereby any unopposed individual choice
should be incorporated in the collective choice. Second is non-dictatorship: the
social choice function should not depend only upon the preferences of one indi-
vidual. The third criterion, transitivity, states that if the collective group prefers A
to B and B to C, then A should be preferred to C. The fourth condition is unre-
stricted domain; there is no restriction on the preferences one can have across
available alternatives. Finally, the independence of irrelevant alternatives condi-
tion requires that the group's preference between A and B not be affected by non-
nominated alternatives, those outside the original subset of options. KENNETH J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1-6 (1963).
182. See Charles K. Rowley, Wealth Maximization in Normative Law and Economics: A
Social Choice Analysis, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 971, 984 (1998).
183. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BE-
TWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 239
(1982).
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as the basis for democratic interaction. 8 4 In this manner, CBA's underlying as-
sumptions call into question its democratic resonance, if any. Namely, CBA's
reliance on the aggregation of preferences measured by monetary units threat-
ens its ability to produce results not susceptible to political manipulation.'
Some theorists have responded, however, by suggesting avenues through
which deliberation can help mitigate the social choice critique, and by analogy,
CBA's tenuous foundations. David Miller" 6 and John Dryzek,"8 I for example,
argue that deliberation can help relax Arrow's unrestricted domain restric-
tion,' 8 thus obviating the notion that collective choice will necessarily be
marred by individual, strategic dictators. According to this argument, there are
features of deliberation that can help promote preferences that are "single-
peaked" in the sense that when all "available options are arrayed on a contin-
uum, the individual's preference must fall continuously on either side of the
most preferred position."'' 9 In other words, single-peakedness implies that
184. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public
Choice Theory for Statutory Interpretation, 74 VA. L. REV. 275, 284 (1988) (noting
that Arrow's thesis implies that "results achieved under 'democratic' voting rules
are arbitrary"); Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic In-
quiry into Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 8o GEO. L.J. 1787, 1822
(1992) (challenging those who argue for judicial review of legislative judgments on
the grounds that democratic rule is "inherently desirable").
185. One might argue that CBA is immune to this set of critiques because it does not
depend on an ordinal theory of preferences. This objection would be mistaken. At
root, CBA rests on a principle of potential Pareto efficiency, otherwise known as
the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Instrumentalisms, 120
HARV. L. REV. 2113, 2121 (2007) (reviewing BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A
MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW (2006)) (discussing the "Kal-
dor-Hicks criterion, including its many refinements in the discipline of cost-
benefit analysis"). On this view, a policy would be justified if enough benefits were
generated to potentially compensate those who would be made worse off by the
policy, though these compensations need not be made in practice. As a result, the
underlying rationale remains that of ordinal Pareto efficiency, on the theory that
individual utility need not be compared, as long as a common unit of individual
gains and losses (money) were available. See Edward I. McCaffery, Slouching To-
wards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103
YALE L.J. 595, 636-37 (1993) ("Because the Kaldor-Hicks standard, like the Paretian
ones, grew out of attempts to avoid interpersonal utility comparisons, the norm is
strictly and properly an ordinal one.").
186. David Miller, Deliberative Democracy and Social Choice, 40 POL. STUD. 54, 60-65
(1992).
187. DRYZEK, supra note 17, at 42-47.
188. This assumption presumes that every logically possible set of individual orderings
is included in the domain of the collective choice rule. See Amartya Sen, The Im-
possibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 153 (1970).
189. DRYZEK, supra note 17, at 43.
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when options are laid out on a spectrum, each individual has some choice they
prefer the most, while moving away from this choice in either direction is less
preferred. The implication is that voters will understand the choice facing them
in the same way, even if they have different optimal points along the contin-
uum; there is only one dimension of choice. 90
Insofar as single-peakedness allays the social choice critique, deliberation
can help citizens form such single-peaked preferences by separating out differ-
ent dimensions of choice. 9' That is, by requiring that participants give reasons
for the alternatives they favor, deliberation will likely uncover whether there are
just one or multiple dimensions of disagreement underlying the original set of
alternatives subject to CBA. If more than one dimension exists, then discussion
can help tease each of them out. Analysts can then split the factors underlying
the original decision into their various components such that all preferences are
as single-peaked as possible. Resulting cost-benefit studies will reflect a more
coherent and well-specified set of policy preferences.
To illustrate, say a city is faced with the choice of whether to meet its energy
needs through the construction of a nuclear, coal or gas-fired power plant. 9 It
decides to conduct a CBA of each option. There are many dimensions that may
underlie the choice: relative costs, environmental sustainability, number of jobs
created, and so on. If coal-fired stations were favored on cost grounds, then the
issue of environmental sustainability could be detached by conducting a sepa-
rate CBA on whether the plants should be fitted with carbon scrubbers or other
filters at the cost of some loss in output. So two sets of cost-benefit analyses
could be carried out: one concerning the ratio of costs to output and another in
terms of the costs of environmental technology.
In this manner, by disaggregating the various issues through reason-giving,
deliberation can help ensure that information about collective preferences is
more consistent and less prone to manipulation. It can also stimulate novel pol-
icy options and creative ways of thinking about the problem at hand. Delibera-
19o. See Duncan Black, On the Rationale of Group Decision-Making, 56 J. POL. EcON. 23
(1948). More formally, the individual's utility decreases monotonically as the pol-
icy moves away from the optimal choice. To illustrate, say voters were faced with a
choice between various amounts of public spending (and corresponding taxation)
on the local school. Suppose some voter decided that she would only send her
child to the school if public spending were high. If public spending were low, she
would rather send her child to a private school, thus not receiving any benefits
from the local school. Thus, she would least prefer to have a medium amount
spent on the local school since not only would she have to pay more in taxes, but
her child would not receive any of the benefits of the local school. This voter's
preferences-(i) high spending, (2) low spending, and (3) medium spending-
would not be single-peaked, since when they were arrayed on an increasing array
(low-medium-high) of spending from left to right, her utility would have two lo-
cal maxima on both ends.
191. Miller, supra note 186, at 64.
192. See id.
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tive cost-benefit analysis thus seeks to rebut social choice critics skeptical about
robust notions of democracy and the place of citizens in helping to formulating
the rules that govern them.
B. Raw Preferences
The second major justification for deliberative cost-benefit analysis stems
from CBA's presumption that administrative accountability is largely a matter
of serving citizens' predetermined wants. In this view, individual preferences are
assumed to exist wholly independently from attempts to discover and respond
to them. This premise, however, is both descriptively and normatively prob-
lematic insofar as preferences do not arise outside and apart from their social
context, but rather are influenced by both the process and substance of policy-
making itself.'93 In other words, preferences are endogenous and can be shaped
by those who purport to objectively measure them. Taking such preferences as
given not only results in meaningless data, but also misses the opportunity to
educate and correct mistaken or distorted beliefs.
Therefore, deliberative forums that provide information and allow for de-
bate have the potential to generate valuations that reflect informed and thus
more valid preferences. Full information is important because CBA assumes
that measured preferences-whether revealed or stated-represent individuals'
decisions made in their real interest. They should reflect what citizens would
genuinely want as a matter of policy. Deliberative CBA can help create avenues
for greater information-sharing and mutual learning.
For example, say a group of citizens is faced with the question of whether to
build a nuclear power plant to meet its energy needs. Consider one individual
in this group, Smith, who is well aware that the plant could pose threats to pub-
lic health and so has gathered all the available information on health risks. De-
ciding they were not significant enough, she has stated a high willingness-to-pay
for the nuclear plant. During deliberations, however, another citizen-Jones-
argues vigorously against the plant on environmental grounds, an issue Smith
did not even think to consider. As a result, because she cares about the envi-
ronment, Smith would now try to gather as much information as possible on
the plant's environmental risks through available resources and experts. She
would then revise her willingness-to-pay for the nuclear plant, thus helping to
ensure the contingent valuation was as robust as possible.
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson also point out that being informed
of one's risks or told of the probability of their occurrence is a far cry from fully
appreciating their dangers. 94 For instance, seeing a co-worker die from lung
cancer after constantly breathing workplace fumes is different from being told
193. Reich, supra note 13, at 1625-31 (describing "social leaning" arising from "both the
process and the substance of policy decisions [that] necessarily generate profound
social learning about public values").
194. GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 21, at 185.
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that one has a one-in-one-hundred chance of contracting cancer from one's as-
sembly-line job. Often, however, one must make choices on, say, which job to
take based only on the latter information; these choices are in turn often used to
infer the value placed on the job.' 95 Thus, deliberative forums can present op-
portunities in which individual testimonies can render more vivid the nature of
the risks at stake.' 96 Listening to stories from a first-person perspective would
allow people to fully appreciate the nature of the risks at stake. As such, delib-
eration can help mitigate CBA's reliance on uninformed or misguided prefer-
ences, namely, by presenting opportunities for the exchange of information and
the fuller appreciation of its implications.
C. Underestimating the Public
Another crucial assumption underlying the traditional economic analysis of
public goods-and revealed preference theory in particular-is that people val-
ue these goods only in their roles as consumers and producers. If people have
concerns about the environment that cannot adequately be expressed through
commodity consumption, willingness-to-pay statistics will not capture them.
This observation suggests an important role for deliberation not only to help
individuals form a collective understanding of the public interest, but also to
allow them to revise their market behavior (or, in the case of continent valua-
tion, their stated preferences) accordingly.
Ample research suggests that individuals do not always act out of pure self-
interest, but rather develop a greater sense of empathy and the common good
through interaction with others.197 This opportunity to transform and express
self-regarding preferences into public-regarding preferences is important in
195. Indeed, the hedonic wage method for calculating the value of a statistical life is
premised on just such logic. See generally Richard Thaler & Sherwin Rosen, The
Value of Saving a Life: Evidence from the Labor Market, in HOUSEHOLD PRODUC-
TION AND CONSUMPTION 265 (N. Terlekyj ed., 1976) (describing the hedonic wage
method).
196. Again, I anticipate that some like Cass Sunstein would argue that allowing for per-
sonal testimony would only exacerbate the infusion of emotion and irrationality
that plagues risk analyses. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 1065-73. However, such
worries can be mitigated by preserving the role of experts who would provide in-
formation on the actual magnitude of risks and the ways in which such risks can
be exaggerated. Allowing citizens opportunities to appreciate the nature of the
dangers involved is not the same thing as amplifying them needlessly.
197. See, e.g., JOHN GASTIL, DEMOCRACY IN SMALL GROUPS: PARTICIPATION, DECISION
MAKING & COMMUNICATION 103-42 (1993) (describing successful examples of
"small group democracy"); Robert Boyd & Peter J. Richerson, Culture and Coop-
eration, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 111-32 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 199o); see also
infra note 200. See generally Tali Mendelberg, The Deliberative Citizen: Theory and
Evidence, 6 POL. DECISION MAKING, DELIBERATION & PARTICIPATION 151 (2002)
(surveying studies).
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contexts where people may be especially willing to pay more to prevent greater
risks to others, either out of targeted altruism or a broader sense of the common
good. 9' Indeed, empirical evidence indicates that deliberation can help develop
other-regarding preferences and feelings of trust, cooperation and empathy. 99
Small-group experiments have shown that when verbal interaction leads indi-
viduals to perceive a consensus to cooperate, such discussion can become a
powerful predictor of actual cooperation. 00
Another interesting finding from the perspective of deliberative cost-
benefit analysis is that no circumstance increases cooperation in social dilemma
experiments more dramatically than face-to-face communication.0 1 A review of
over one-hundred experiments found that face-to-face communication in so-
cial dilemma games raised cooperation by forty to forty-five percentage
points. 2 Similarly, other experimental studies have shown that discussion can
create a norm of group-interest in which individuals identify their own self-
interest with the self-interest of every other member of the group. 3 This norm
in turn encourages individuals to act with the goal of maximizing the group's
interests as a whole, thus reflecting the public rather than private good. 0 4 By
organizing explicit opportunities for robust discussion, deliberative cost-benefit
analysis provides insights into how individuals would value social goods when
considering the broader public interest.
D. Lack of Democratic Scrutiny
The final class of problems deliberative cost-benefit analysis confronts is
the array of administrative decisions routinely made without proper democratic
oversight. Such decisions specify a number of variables that can differ from
study to study. Each of these variables, in turn, implicates deep value judgments
198. See supra Part II.B (discussing changed preferences after deliberation about Texas
utilities provision).
199. See supra note 197.
200. See Norbert L. Kerr & Cynthia M. Kaufman-Gilliland, Communication, Commit-
ment, and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 66 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
513, 522-24 (1994); see also Kelly S. Bouas & S.S. Komorita, Group Discussion and
Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 22 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1144
(1996).
201. See Elinor Ostrom, A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collec-
tive Action, 92 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1, 12 (1998).
202. See David Sally, Conversation and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: A Meta-
Analysis of Experiments from 1958 to 1992, 7 RATIONALITY & Soc. 58 (1995).
203. See Robyn M. Dawes, Alphons J.C. van de Kragt & John M. Orbell, Cooperation for
the Benefit of Us: Not Me, or My Conscience, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra note
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wholly independent from the expertise that administrators profess to possess.
As such, any democratically legitimate CBA must be subject to public scrutiny,
both in terms of transparency and, more substantively, reflective discussion ori-
ented toward the public interest.
First, any CBA must grapple with what has sometimes been referred to as
the problem of "standing." 05 That is, bureaucrats must make decisions about
which preferences should matter, or have standing, in the study. In theory, the
analyst should measure all of the benefits and costs of a potential rule, regard-
less of who bears them. In practice, however, CBA routinely rejects many pref-
erences as illegitimate, including those of convicted criminals, illegal immi-
grants and foreigners, even when the policies may directly impact them.2"6
While there may be sound reasons to deny some preferences standing in a CBA,
such political decisions on who does and does not count as worthy of inclusion
must be in the hands of a democratically accountable body. By posing such
questions to a microcosm of the public, deliberative cost-benefit analysis pro-
vides this opportunity.
Another major decision that bureaucrats currently control revolves around
the issue of how much to discount future benefits and costs. As previously dis-
cussed," 7 analysts regularly discount future benefits and costs on the theory
that resources in hand today are more valuable than resources available later,
because one could invest the resources today and receive some positive re-
turn.208 Such discount rates have the potential to change completely the results
of a CBA. When the EPA conducted a study for setting arsenic standards in
drinking water, for example, it included benefits stemming from the number of
lives saved, valued at $6.1 million.' 9 A rival study conducted by a think tank,
however, criticized the agency study for not using a discount rate to conclude
that the present value of a life-saved was, in fact, sm million-a difference be-
tween the two studies of $5 million for each life saved. 10 Though discount rates
are often presented as an objective and technical issue, in reality, the decision
fundamentally implicates questions about the relative value of present and fu-
ture members of the political community.
205. See Dale Whittington & Duncan McRae, Jr., The Issue of Standing in Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 5 J. POL'Y. ANALYSIS & MGMT. 665,666 (1986).
206. Id. at 665, 667-68 (1986). Debates over how to count a policy's benefits and costs
to fetuses, non-humans, and the environment also exemplify this issue. See Wil-
liam N. Trumbull, Who Has Standing in Cost-Benefit Analysis, 9 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS
& MGMT. 201, 201 (1990); Richard 0. Zerbe Jr., Comment: Does Benefit Cost Analy-
sis Stand Alone? Rights and Standing, io J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 96 (1991).
207. See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text.
208. See Heinzerling, supra note 121, at 2043.
209. For a full discussion of this case study, see LISA HEINZERLING & FRANK ACKER-
MAN, PRICING THE PRICELESS: COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 17-20 (2001).
210. Id.
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Along similar lines, bureaucrats also implicitly make decisions about the
relative worth of past generations when choosing certain variables for analysis.
For example, though many agencies base benefit estimates on what is called the
"value of a statistical life," others use the "value of statistical life-years," which
looks at the number of years saved as opposed to the number of statistical
lives." In effect, such reliance on life-years as opposed to the lives themselves
rations regulatory protections or public funding based on age, thus elevating
life-saving measures aimed at the young over those that primarily protect the
elderly. Yet there is little evidence showing that the elderly value their lives any
less than the young, nor are any less willing to pay for regulatory benefits-no
matter how many life-years they have remaining." ' In this manner, the practice
of using life-years skews against protections that primarily benefit the elderly.
Furthermore, analysts must also confront the question of what constitutes
value for society, manifested in the choice between measuring use-value or non-
use value."3 Use-value is the value that people purportedly receive in the direct,
physical use of certain goods or services. 1 4 In contrast, non-use value consists of
the value people receive from appreciating certain goods such as the Grand
Canyon from afar, or simply knowing that such goods exist. 5 Thus, while re-
vealed-preference studies may reveal the former, only contingent valuation sur-
veys can capture the latter. More fundamentally, the choice between whether to
measure use-value or non-use value represents the abstract but no less signifi-
cant question of how to conceive of the good life-broadly understood as the
kinds of things that people esteem.
The point of underscoring the nature of these decisions is not to say they
should not be made, for in any scarce society, they must. However, each deci-
sion implicates values that a group of citizens deliberating together-not ad-
ministrators and experts acting alone-must identify in a transparent and re-
flective manner. Deliberative cost-benefit analysis advocates a firm policy
presumption to create such opportunities for open debate. These commitments
not only respect and build upon the deliberative impulse of the APA, but more
211. See Lisa Heinzerling, The Rights of Statistical People, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189,
205-06 (2000); Cass Sunstein, Valuing Life: A Plea for Disaggregation, 54 DUKE L.J.
385, 413 (2004) ("Along the same lines, many analysts suggest that regulatory pol-
icy should focus not on the value of statistical lives but on the value of statistical
life-years....").
212. Based on protests from senior citizen groups complaining that the approach
wrongly devalued their lives, the EPA recently decided to end its practice of the
"death discount," where it considered life-years rather than lives saved. See John J.
Fialka, EPA To Stop "Death Discount" To Value New Regulations, WALL ST. J., May
8, 2003, at D3.
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importantly, render more democratically legitimate the procedures through
which coercive regulations are promulgated.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND ANSWERS
Deliberative cost-benefit analysis will likely have its detractors, either at the
level of theory or implementation. The next section will anticipate two of the
strongest objections: the first more theoretical, the second more pragmatic.
A. Lay Citizens Versus Experts
The first objection will come from those who believe that administrators
possess the unique training and expertise to make them solely suited to promul-
gate rules, especially when the rule involves highly complex or scientific judg-
ments. The "civil service system, with its emphasis on merit appointments, ex-
pertise and professionalism, rests on the idea of discretion: the idea that
administrative officials should be free to employ their expertise and training in
pursuit of the policy responsibilities delegated to them."2 6 In this view, involv-
ing lay citizens in what is inherently an expert enterprise would not only be dis-
ruptive, but would also result in greater public harm. Better to entrust agency
officials with deploying the various analytic tools and knowledge available to
them.
It is important to distinguish, however, between different kinds of exper-
tise, and at what junctures such expertise would influence the rulemaking proc-
ess. Expertise will no doubt be important in certain information-gathering
stages. In particular, it will be critical when such information consists of data on
particular immutable facts such as the chemical make-up and health effects of a
new proposed drug, or the impact of a chemical on the ozone. Expertise is im-
portant here since basic research and risk predictions require techniques culled
after years of experience and training."'
However, such expertise is inapposite in at least two situations: the first,
when the information gathering is aimed at registering social preferences and,
second, in circumstances of indeterminacy, when expertise is successful only in
narrowing a range of probabilities. During the former, expertise by itself cannot
answer questions that will necessarily require political value judgments such as
the appropriate discount rate or questions of standing. Reasonable people can
disagree. Moreover, policy analysts currently attempt to register social prefer-
ences that are uninformed, self-interested, and wholly private; in light of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), these premises ring hollow. Therefore,
216. BRYNER, supra note 5, at 5.
217. RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 213-15 (2004) (propos-
ing a center for catastrophic-risk assessment and response, members of which
would serve as expert witnesses or advisors).
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there is ample room for citizen deliberation over the assumptions underlying
preference measurement.
Second, expertise will also be necessary in narrowing ranges of probabili-
ties, whether they include risk profiles or the likelihood of a catastrophic disas-
ter.218 Within these bounds, there is room for discretion that cannot be con-
strained by scientific dictates alone. As such, deliberative forums offer citizens
the opportunity to offer informed input on how to choose within these reason-
able probability bands. Indeed, there is little basis for assuming that lay citizens
will be unable to appreciate or comprehend technical information. 1 9 Doing so
underestimates the ability of lay citizens to understand well-presented analyses,
and also gives short shrift to the ability of policy analysts to explain and educate.
Experts within administrative agencies are continually called upon to translate
their judgments and the reasoning behind them for public consumption. Civil
servants must regularly present their evaluations to regulatory heads, who are
often political appointees and thus not always conversant in the technical de-
tails of each rule. In this manner, policy analysts could serve a democratic, edu-
cative function in deliberative cost-benefit analysis.
One might also argue that involving lay citizens in the regulatory process
only increases opportunities for capture, as business and interest groups will at-
tempt to influence or buy off citizens. Here, more public participation only ex-
acerbates the number of access points for special interests to sway regulatory
outcomes. There are a number of responses, however, to this charge. First,
compared to the status quo, lay citizens have fewer incentives than career civil
servants to be bought off by businesses interests. Unlike civil servants who serve
longer tenures and may benefit from the notorious "revolving door" between
industry and the government, lay citizens will not possess the same incentives.
Just as criminal jury research suggests that lay citizens take their task very
seriously, 20 administrative agencies could also take great care to impress upon
participants the important civic function they will be serving. During delibera-
tions, participants would be instructed not to discuss the rule with outside par-
ties. More pragmatically, citizens called to serve on regulatory juries will be ran-
domly selected beforehand, making it difficult for special interest organizations
to target those individuals in time. Any lingering bribery attempts could be po-
liced through mandatory disclosure statements.
In short, there are many reasons why insulated expertise should not have a
monopoly on the grounds for decision-making. The authors of the APA "hoped
for a system in which citizens and representatives, operating through responsive
218. Id. at 139-98 (discussing issues in evaluating catastrophic risk).
219. See STUART HILL, DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHOICES 55-89
(1992) (providing an optimistic account of lay citizens' abilities to assess risks).
220. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66
BROOK. L. REv. 1121, 1148 (2001) ("[S]tudies indicate that, at least from juror re-
ports, there is little evidence that juries take their task lightly. All of the reports
strongly suggested that jurors were motivated to take the task seriously.").
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but expert organs, would make deliberative decisions about the basis system of
public law."2 ' In this spirit, deliberative cost-benefit analysis seeks to be com-
plementary to, not mutually exclusive with, the important function of experts
in a modern democracy.
B. Costs
The second main objection will likely center on the costs of implementing
deliberative costs-benefit: ironically, critics will ask, do the benefits outweigh
the costs of deliberative cost-benefit analysis? The easiest response, unlikely to
convince detractors, will be that the normative requirements of the APA cannot
be subjected to blind considerations of efficiency; thus, expenses should not be
a dispositive concern. For those remaining unconvinced, however, administra-
tive agencies already engage in a number of efforts to increase public participa-
tion and lay citizen involvement. Therefore, it is reasonable to predict that de-
liberative cost-benefit analysis would not create burdens that depart radically
from the status quo.
To illustrate, the expenses of negotiated rulemaking already include those
of hiring experts, soliciting testimony, and providing rooms and staff. The only
added costs of deliberative cost-benefit analysis, then, would be the expense of
transporting, say, fifteen or twenty citizens and providing stipends and lodg-
ing." ' These costs, while not trivial, are arguably worth the trade-off in increas-
ing rulemaking legitimacy, and would also likely confer positive externalities on
citizen education.
To put some harder numbers on the analysis, according to the Jefferson
Center, the cost for a classic citizens jury can range anywhere from $35,000 to
$90,000 depending on the issue's scope. 3 Factors that most affect cost are geo-
graphic breadth, the number of jurors and how much staff time is needed to
manage the project. The more complex or contentious the issue under consid-
eration, the more staff time will be required in setting up a credible advisory
committee and finding appropriate witnesses. Given these variable dimensions,
deliberative cost-benefit analysis should be subject to the same cost-
minimization efforts that administrative agencies already undertake for notice-
and-comment, stakeholder meetings, and consultations.
One could imagine several cost-cutting measures. For example, agencies
may attempt to recruit representative samples of participants not from the en-
tire national population, but more localized areas that correspond to their re-
gional offices, yet still reflect diverse socio-economic or cultural perspectives.
Alternatively, one nationally representative deliberative jury could be asked to
221. CASS SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 325 (1997).
222. For one attempt to calculate the cost and explore the logistics of deliberative fo-
rums, see ACKERMAN & FISHKIN, supra note loo, at 221-28.
223. Jefferson Center-Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.jefferson-center.org
(follow "FAQ" hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 8, 2008).
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consider a number of questions that would then inform a host of studies. Fur-
thermore, it is also important to keep in mind that the direct costs of carrying
out deliberative cost analysis have the potential to be dwarfed by the actual costs
saved. It would not take much in the way of increased benefits or decreased
costs of a rule-whether in time-saved or litigation avoided 2 ---to enable the
procedure to pay for itself, given that the annual costs imposed by regulatory
rules currently range from $40 to $46 billion."' In this manner, while the net
monetary burdens of deliberative cost-benefit analysis will ultimately be an em-
pirical question, there are a number of reasons to think the marginal costs
would be well worth it.
CONCLUSION
The Administrative Procedure Act celebrates the deliberative impulse in
regulatory rulemaking. Notice-and-comment procedures invite administrators
to deliberate with external parties under the watchful eye of the courts. Because
these parties are often unrepresentative, however, a growing chorus of reform-
ers touts cost-benefit analysis as a ready substitute that properly considers the
preferences of all citizens. By aggregating individuals' willingness-to-pay, cost-
benefit analysis appears both expert and objective. At face value, then, delibera-
tion and cost-benefit analysis seem at cross-purposes. Where one empowers lay
citizens to shape the rules that govern them, the other injects much needed ra-
tionality and expands the circle of interests considered.
These apparent disagreements frequently bleed into political rhetoric. Tra-
ditionally, free-market conservatives are styled as the champions of cost-benefit
analysis in their attempt, say liberals, to foster deregulation in favor of big-
business. At the same time, liberals-comfortably ensconced at EPA, say con-
servatives-simply allow their indeterminate beliefs about equity and fairness to
dictate their decisions.
Deliberative cost-benefit analysis explodes these false dichotomies. Gather-
ing people to discuss their priorities before asking how much they would be
willing to pay for different outcomes ensures that measured costs and benefits
represent something meaningful: preferences that are informed and that weigh
the public interest. Deliberative cost-benefit analysis thus offers something for
both sides of the ideological spectrum. It also offers a powerful way to resolve
the administrative state's ongoing struggle for expertise and public participa-
tion. Experts would serve a central role in informing and empowering citizens.
Citizens, in turn, would provide the critical data necessary to expertly evaluate
the social consequences of a regulatory rule. This reflexive relationship magni-
fies both the normative pull and the pragmatic importance of this proposal.
The time for deliberative cost-benefit analysis is ripe.
224. See supra notes 146-15o and accompanying text.
225. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, DRAFT 2007 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 2 (2007).
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